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Letter dated 20 February 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the response by the Government of the State of Israel to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights contained in document A/55/684.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 114 (e) (see annex).*

(*Signed*) Aaron **Jacob**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Exhibit I - Video: *Orientation to the Present Conflict*

several human rights issues, without due reference to similar aspects, including of violations and other matters of human rights and humanitarian concern by the Palestinian Authority, and in the other countries in the region visited by the High Commissioner.

4. While Israel is the only democratic regime in the Middle East and is the only state in the region with extensive institutional protections and non-governmental checks and balances, this significant detail is omitted from the Report.

5. Moreover, the singling out of Israel directly diverged from express assurances of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and of the United Nations Secretary General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, prior to the High Commissioner's visit to the region. In a meeting convened in New York in 2 November 2000, between the UN Secretary General and Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister was assured that the visit of the High Commissioner would not be undertaken pursuant to the Resolution adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its fifth special session (S-5/1 of 19 October 2000). Similar assurances were offered by the High Commissioner herself to Israel's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva. Despite these assurances, the Report expressly refers to the aforementioned Resolution. Clearly, this deficiency places in question the motivation behind the visit, and the very objectivity of the Report. Israel has repeatedly expressed its absolute rejection of this unbalanced and offensive Resolution, and its rejection of the Resolution serving as a basis for the visit.

6. As detailed below, the Government of Israel offers a very different understanding of the causes of the violence and also makes some proposals that could reduce the violence and build trust between the sides. In fact, Palestinian leaders today openly admit that the causes of the violence have long been anticipated and planned by them, from the moment of return from

the Camp David negotiations. Thus, for example, on 5 December 2000, the Palestinian Minister of Communications, Imad Al-Falouji, addressed a symposium of the Journalists Association of Gaza. His remarks were reported in the Arabic daily newspaper *Al-Ayam* on 6 December 2000. Referring to the conflict, Mr Al-Falouji stated that the Palestinian Authority began its preparations for the outbreak of the current violence from the moment of return from the Camp David negotiations. According to Mr Al-Falouji, Yasser Arafat anticipated the eruption of the violence as a consolidation of the firm Palestinian stand in negotiations with Israel and not simply as a protest against Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. The preparations for the Intifada began in accordance with Arafat's request.[1]

7. This has also been acknowledged by the High Commissioner in her speech before the special session of the Commission on Human Rights, on 17 October 2000, stating that "it appears that the crisis that led to the current situation began to emerge following the conclusion of the Camp David meetings, with popular frustration at the impasse that had apparently been reached in the negotiations".

8. While Israel deeply regrets the loss of life and suffering on all sides during the events of recent months, these events were not of Israel's making. Israel acted reasonably in response to the use of armed violence by Palestinians. Israel has made every effort, on all levels, to find a constructive way to bring the violence to an end.

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[1] *Al-Ayam*, 6 December 2000.

Part II

The Shortcomings of the UNHCHR's Report

a. Disregard of Context

9. The Report fails to examine adequately the situation within its appropriate context. There is virtually no reference in the Report to the circumstances of the conflict or to the countless acts of terrorism and violence by Palestinians against Israelis which included the use of live-fire acts of terrorism. While the Report acknowledges "that over an extended period, the right of Israelis to security of person (UDHR, article 3) has been threatened", and that this persistent insecurity has itself given rise to many of the human rights problems in the territories and Israel, it does not categorically deplore, as it should have done, the use of such Palestinian terrorist acts, which are aimed at an express violation of human rights, and the threatening of the security of Israel.

b. Fundamental Flaws

10. Israel considers that there are fundamental inaccuracies and shortcomings in the Report concerning the use of force. Those aspects raised with the High Commissioner that might have given a more balanced picture were ignored or otherwise unhelpfully brief. The Report lacks any presentation of the role played by the use of children in perpetrating violence, or of Palestinian live-fire assaults on Israeli troops and civilians. Furthermore, the Report attempts (para. 24) to draw a comparison between Israel's raising of concerns regarding Palestinian misuse of children in the conflict, and the official incitement on television and in the media by Palestinian officials to kill Israelis and Jews. The Report presents both on an equal footing, as examples of hate speech and incitement. This misrepresentation is particularly alarming and intolerable.

11. Throughout, the Report restates and accepts Palestinian feelings at face value, yet refutes the Israeli concerns one by one. It accepts without question the "deep hurt" (para. 24) experienced by the Palestinians caused by accusations of "forcing" children to participate in the violence. However, the Report does not present nor assess the wealth of evidence which shows how children have, in fact, been actively encouraged to become involved, nor does it raise the issue of official responsibility of the Palestinian authorities for these children's actions.

c. One-sidedness

12. The Report's rendering of Palestinian complaints is often accompanied by curious silences about human rights abuses by the Palestinians. For example, the Report criticizes the denial to Palestinians of "full access" to holy sites (para. 51-53), without offering any mention of the inability of Jews to reach their own religious sites in the territories controlled by the Palestinians, in violation of express agreement between the sides. In fact, the Palestinian desecration of Jewish holy sites in Nablus and Jericho are not even mentioned in the Report. It also overlooks the difficulties incurred by worshippers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem and Rachel's Tomb near Bethlehem, and the violation of their right to freedom of religion, due to Palestinian violence. While the Report actively "expresses concern" to the Israeli authorities on behalf of the Muslim and Christian clerics regarding their holy places (para. 53), the Report does not express similar concern to the Palestinians.

13. In addition, the Report fails to mention that, as part of the Palestinian provocation and the on-going heavy machine-gun attacks against Israeli civilians in Gilo, a residential neighborhood of Jerusalem, were deliberately launched from areas in proximity to churches and other Christian holy sites. This deliberate and cynical use of Christian sites is an effort to draw Israeli

fire that might damage Christian churches, residencies and lives, thereby provoking an international outcry from members of that community. This is clearly an attempt to exploit religious sensitivities against Israel. It is a dangerous attempt to inject religious confrontation into the Arab-Israeli conflict.

14. Regrettably, the Report dismisses with the briefest mention the summary and arbitrary execution of two Israelis in Ramallah, who were brutally tortured to death, mutilated and slaughtered by a Palestinian mob, orchestrated with the overall support of the Palestinian Police in a police station (para. 74). It does not go into any length or provide details regarding this horrific incident and the context in which it has been perpetrated, and the message it conveys to Israelis.

15. The Report describes in considerable detail the economic impact of closures on Palestinians in the territories. However, it does not acknowledge that these restrictions are a reaction to repeated terrorist attacks, and are taken for reasons of security in order to prevent further terrorist action. Instead, these aspects are described in isolation (para. 54-59), without context, as if they were unilaterally imposed by Israel to repress Palestinians. By contrast, the economic impact of the current situation on Israeli society is dismissed in one sentence (para. 60), stating that "it was clear that there have also been negative consequences for the Israeli economy".

16. Whereas the Report draws attention to regrettable incidents of death and injuries of Palestinian children, describing the effect of the present conflict on them, it fails to mention similar injuries to which Israeli children residing in the area are exposed to on a daily basis. Similarly, the Report fails to mention the impact of the situation on Israeli children, and the profound effects on their development, including educational difficulties and post-traumatic stress disorders.

d. Inclusion of Politicized Assertions

17. Regrettably, the Report makes politicized assertions, which not only diverge from the express task assigned by the High Commissioner's mandate, but also frequently prejudges issues which were agreed between the sides to be dealt with in direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Thus, for example, the Report's recommendation on the issue of settlements in the territories is a political one, which touches sensitive issues currently under negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians.

18. Another matter of concern in Israel's view is the recommendation made in the Report "to explore the feasibility of establishing an international monitoring presence" (para. 91). Israel has consistently maintained that it would be willing to consider the possibility of an international presence only as part of a permanent status agreement. Any such presence without a permanent status agreement would not proffer long term security and stability. On the contrary, such a presence could only be a source of conflict between the sides which would lessen its effectiveness, and would be used by the Palestinians to draw in international intervention in the hopes that some would be victimized in the midst of the violence, thus drawing the ire of their governments and supporters. It must be noted that the Palestinians initiated the violence and terror in breach of basic international norms, and specific obligations detailed in the various agreements with Israel. In addition, politically motivated monitoring forces would only add to intensify the tension by offering, as part of its unbalanced mandate, criticism of Israel without making parallel demands upon the Palestinians.

19. Far from contributing to a resumption of peaceful negotiations, Israel is concerned that the Report is being used to contribute to the creation of further polarization. In fact, the Palestinians have already misquoted provisions of the High Commissioner's Report in their papers submitted to

the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (30 December 2000). These discrepancies include the changing of words and descriptions of the High Commissioner[2], the changing of Palestinian reports of events into facts[3] and presenting details observed by the High Commissioner which received answers from Israel and were presented in her Report, but were conveniently ignored by the Palestinians[4]. In light of the above, it is to be regretted, that the Report of the High Commissioner is being abused as a weapon to achieve political gains, rather than as an instrument which could contribute to the resolution of the situation and enhancement of human rights.

20. It is important to recall that the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, established pursuant to the agreement reached with the Palestinians at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit on 16-17 October 2000, is currently studying the events of the recent months. Headed by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, the Committee's delicate task is to Report on the violence of the recent months, its causes and the policies and practices of the Parties, and to recommend ways of preventing the recurrence of violence in the future. In turn, Israel has expressed its faith in the Committee and its agreement to facilitate the completion of the Committee's task expeditiously.

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[2] In footnote 82 of the *Palestinian Second Submission of the PLO to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee*, the term "restriction" was replaced into a "total ban". Similarly, in footnote 83, the words "affect the import" became "deny the import", when in fact, Israel assisted the importing of humanitarian aid. In footnote 97 the Palestinians say that up to 11% of those injured were wounded by rocket attacks, while the Palestinian Minister told the High Commissioner (para. 32) that 11% of those injured were wounded by "other" means (including rockets)"; In footnote 94, the Palestinians noted "highly potent tear gas" grew from the High Commissioner's Report where the Palestinian Minister claimed about "tear gas"

[3] Thus, for example, Footnotes 91-94, 97 all quote figures from the same description of the Palestinian Health Minister in the High Commissioner's Report (para. 32). In the Palestinian Submission, however, it is no longer one side reporting to the High Commissioner, but using these figures as facts as if they were determined by the High Commissioner. Similarly, in notes 77, 84 and 87, the Palestinians turned into facts unsubstantiated claims that the High Commissioner was informed about. Additionally, often those figures are different than those quoted by the Minister to the High Commissioner. This is true in footnotes 91, 92, 93, 94 and 97.

[4] For instance, see footnotes 77 and 80 in the *Palestinian Second Submission to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee*.

21. Israel views with concern the UN High Commissioner's reference to the High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, suggesting that they "assume their responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention to ensure respect". It is worth noting that Israel alone, among the many states which have come into control of territories, has chosen to be guided by the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and to apply them to the territories under its control. Many other states belligerently occupying territory since World World II, have totally ignored its application. Particularly, in the light of the evolving situation in these areas, which are currently under on-going negotiations, Israel considers the aforementioned remark by the High Commissioner as inappropriate and politically inspired. Notwithstanding the above, it is also worthy to note that the drafting history of Article 1 and its subsequent commentaries, offer no legal support to the High Commissioner's recommendation. The Convention's authors never meant to suggest that Contracting States not party to an armed conflict are under such a positive international legal obligation to 'ensure' that belligerent parties respect the Conventions. This interpretation was added only recently, several decades following the entry into force of the Convention.

Part III

General Aspects of the Current Violence

a. The Causes of the Violence

18. While Israel is not suggesting that there is no wider context for the present violence within the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, it is, however, too simplistic to lay the violence of the past 137 days at the doorstep of that conflict in general terms. Although there have been incidents of violence in the period since the start of the Oslo process, progress towards a Permanent Status Agreement has proceeded in the absence of violence on the scale of that witnessed in recent months. The question, therefore, is what happened in the period prior to late September 2000 which acted as a catalyst for the recent events.

19. The significant developments in this period were the Camp David negotiations of July 2000, and the widespread appreciation in the international community that their failure was due to inflexibility on the Palestinian side. These were the immediate and principal catalytic events leading to the violence. Underlying this was a longer-term policy of the Palestinian leadership which effectively laid the groundwork for a campaign of violence to further the goal of the unilateral establishment of a Palestinian State.

20. A number of elements in respect of this appreciation call for further preliminary comment. First, contrary to the publicly expressed views of the Palestinian side that the cause of the violence was a spontaneous and popular reaction to the visit by Mr Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000, this was not the case. While the Sharon visit may have been used as an excuse for the violence, it was not the cause. As has

already been suggested, the cause is deeper-rooted and predates Mr Sharon's visit by some time.

21. Second, as the preceding appreciation of the immediate causes of the events of recent months makes clear, the violence was instigated and coordinated; it was not spontaneous. It was also fanned, both in the period leading up to the commencement of the violence and during the course of the conflict, by incitement to violence and hostile propaganda which was articulated and encouraged by leaders and opinion makers in the Palestinian community – public and vociferous intonations to kill Jews and Israelis proclaimed by Imams at Friday prayers, incendiary descriptions of Israel and Jews in books introduced into the curriculum at Palestinian schools, including those for young children, calling for a religious conflict against Israel in the period following the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations, as well as other elements.

22. Third, not only was the violence nurtured, planned and prosecuted as an instrument of policy by the Palestinian leadership but key elements of the Palestinian security apparatus have actively participated in the violence. The violence, notably in its live-fire dimensions, thus has had all the characteristics of an armed conflict – live-fire attacks on a significant scale, both quantitatively and geographically; by a well armed and organised militia; under the command of a political establishment; operating from areas outside Israeli control; pursuing political aims.

23. Fourth, at its most basic level, the very fact of the violence attests to the failure on the part of the PLO and Palestinian Authority to take the steps that they committed themselves to in the agreements with Israel to forestall violence and terror. Far from acting to prevent violence, the PLO, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Police have actively supported and directed the violence. Violence was a means to an end - the regaining

of the diplomatic initiative. The means to this end were the inevitable Palestinian casualties – inevitable because of the confrontational practices that would be pursued by the Palestinians.

b. Palestinian Hostile Propaganda and Incitement to Violence

24. Article XXII(1) of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) provides that the Parties "shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda". Paragraph (2) of the same Article addresses hostile propaganda in the educational system, providing expressly that the Parties "will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation". These provisions are echoed explicitly in paragraph 2(b) of the Note for the Record of 15 January 1997 and in section II, paragraph 3 of the Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998. The obligations to take measures to preclude hostile propaganda and to refrain from incitement stand at the very core of the peace process.

25. Notwithstanding these commitments, hostile propaganda directed against Jews and Israelis, officially sanctioned, and of the most insidious kind, is all too evident. This is particularly so in the case of children. One example is that of a Palestinian children's television programme called the "Children's Club" which, through a "Sesame Street" formula involving interaction between children, puppets and fictional characters, encourages a hatred for Jews and the perpetration of violence against them in a "jihad" or "holy war".

26. These policies and practices of propaganda and incitement have been a central and on-going feature of the violence. The propaganda and

incitement has, however, been more extensive than the instances just highlighted suggest. For example, as is shown on the orientation video, frequently repeated broadcasts on Palestinian television exhort the Palestinian population to make molotov cocktails and store them in their homes as they would food. Prominent Palestinian leaders are shown on television and heard on radio making inflammatory speeches at funerals and elsewhere calling on the crowd to kill Israelis. Daily current affairs programmes call upon Palestinians to "continue the popular and noble actions". Other broadcasts call upon "the public to immediately take to streets in order to express its rage." These are all official statements, conveying the views of the Palestinian leadership. They are not the result of omissions on the part of the Palestinian Authority to control such broadcasts. This is an active policy of incitement to violence and hostility, characterized by an advocacy of national, racial, and religious hatred. It stands in blatant violation of the most basic norms and principles of international human rights law, but the High Commissioner for Human Rights chose to understate these details, simply saying that this "shocked" her.

c. The Nature of the Conflict

27. Since the outbreak of violence, there have been around 9,000 attacks by Palestinians against Israelis – civilians, police and military – virtually all life threatening. Of these, some 3,000 involved the use of automatic weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, or explosives of other kinds. Some 500 Israelis have been injured in these attacks and 52 killed. Around 322 Palestinians have been killed and around 9,000 injured. Although accurate figures are impossible to come by, independent sources have claimed that, of the Palestinians injured, around 20% have been injured by live-fire,

around 40% by rubber bullets and around 30% by the inhalation of tear gas. In around 10% of cases the cause of injury is unknown.[5]

28. Israel is engaged in an armed conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a peaceful demonstration or a riot. It is characterised by live-fire attacks on a significant scale, both quantitatively and geographically – around 3,000 such attacks over the entire area of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The attacks are carried out by a well-armed and organised militia, under the command of the Palestinian political establishment, operating from areas outside Israeli control.

29. Fatah, the political-military grouping within the PLO answerable directly to Yasser Arafat, has a sizeable militia component of its own, the Tanzim. The Tanzim has been the mainstay of this conflict, distributing Molotov cocktails, organizing attacks, perpetrating violence. It has been the armed actions of the Tanzim that has enabled the Palestinian leadership to turn the present crisis into a confrontation on the scale of an armed conflict. Tanzim forces are charged with marshalling people for action, organising that action and distributing weapons such as molotov cocktails. They also provide the principal live-fire dimension to the Palestinian attacks.

30. Armed action by the Tanzim has gone hand-in-hand with the involvement of key elements of the Palestinian Police, particularly by its "Preventive Security Force" component in the Gaza Strip and by its "General Intelligence" component in the West Bank. Together, these militia have been responsible for attacks on both Israeli troops and civilians, including bomb attacks, such as the one on the children's school bus in Kfar Darom on 20 November 2000, and the frequent shooting incidents targeted at civilians in the West Bank.

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[5] See December 2000 report of *B'Tselem* into the recent events, at p.6.

31. By way of further example, the Tanzim, possibly acting with elements of the Palestinian Police, were responsible for infiltrating the IDF position at Kfar Darom on 18 November 2000 in which two Israeli soldiers were killed. They were responsible for an explosion at the southern District Coordination Office in the Gaza Strip on 23 November 2000 in which an Israeli soldier died. They were also responsible for the activation of a series of explosive devices in the Hebron area in October 2000 as well as the placing of a number of such devices in the Bethlehem area during November 2000.

32. In the majority of cases, Palestinian attacks against Israelis have taken the form of a large number of Palestinians, invariably in the hundreds and sometimes greater, usually including a live-fire dimension, attacking either a small number of Israeli civilians or a small number of Israeli troops. Typically, Israeli troops coming under attack have numbered fewer than 20. On many occasions, this number is lower. They have been extremely violent, leaving the intended Israeli targets in no doubt as to the fate that would befall them if they fell into the hands of their attackers.

33. Typically, their assailants have numbered in the hundreds. Stones, molotov cocktails, pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, explosives – these have been the Palestinians' weapons of war. They have taken place in areas from which Israel has been progressively withdrawing over recent years in accordance with the agreements concluded between the two sides as part of the peace process, generally in sites at which there is a limited Israeli presence. The attacks have thus involved the threat and use of lethal force by Palestinians against Israelis who have been both numerically and geographically vulnerable. In light of this reality, it is evident that this is clearly not a peaceful, non violent demonstration, nor a riot. Rather, it has been a calculated attempt to use violence as part of armed assaults

amounting to either terrorist or officially-sponsored initiatives to create new facts on the ground.

Part IV

Palestinian Policies and Practices

a. The Exploitation of Children and Their Military Training

34. Hostile propaganda and incitement to violence is particularly evident in the case of children. This message emerges from school books used in Palestinian classrooms in the current academic year (2000 – 2001), many of which were prepared by the Palestinian Ministry of Education. Thus, for example, a textbook entitled Muqarar al-Tilawa Wa'ahkam Al-Tajwid prepared for 5th graders, describes Jews as cowards for whom Allah has prepared fires of hell.[6] In a text for 8th graders, Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus al-Adabia, Israelis are referred to as the butchers in Jerusalem.[7] Stories glorifying those who throw stones at soldiers are found in various texts.[8] A 9th grade text, Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus al-Adabia, refers to the bacteria of Zionism that has to be uprooted out of the Arab nation.[9] The list is long and goes on in a similar vein.

35. One of the most disturbing elements of the conflict has been the active involvement on the Palestinian side of children in violent attacks directed against Israelis. This has included the practice of armed Palestinians firing at Israelis from within or behind crowds of demonstrators, including children. The Palestinian leadership, Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Police are under a positive obligation to restrain the involvement of children in such episodes. They have done virtually nothing towards this

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[6] *Muqarar al-Tilawa Wa'ahkan Al-Tajwid* ("Koran Recitement and Rules of Proper Reading"), at p.67.
[7] *Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus Al-Adabia* ("Reading and Literary Texts"), at p.120
[8] See, for example, *Al-Tatbikat Al-Lughawiya* ("Language Exercises"), a textbook for 8th graders, at p.71.
[9] *Al Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus al-Adabia* ("Reading and Literary Texts"), at p.114 – 117.

end. On the contrary, there is evidence of active and long-term encouragement by the Palestinian leadership of the participation of children in the violence. Shockingly, the High Commissioner simply dismisses Israeli claims of this as "hurtful" remarks bordering on incitement.

36. In light of growing international concern about the inappropriate involvement of children in armed conflict, despite international prohibitions against this practice, the Palestinian leadership has actively developed a policy of military training for children in so-called "summer camps". During the summer of 2000, some 27,000 Palestinian children between the ages of 7 - 18 took part in such camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These camps were funded by the Palestinian Authority. The largest of the camps were under the direction of Fatah, the principal military-political grouping of the PLO of which Yasser Arafat is the head. A common activity was preparation for armed conflict. Amongst other activities, the children were trained in the operation of firearms. These activities are detailed in the orientation video.

37. The summer camps are part of a wider practice which has seen children under the age of 18 "conscripted" into the Fatah militia – known as the Tanzim – as well as into special Fatah Youth cadres – known as the Shabibah. In this role, many of these children carry weapons and are trained in their use. The training of children as young as seven in military techniques and methods of violence constitutes a violation of basic international humanitarian norms and principles.

38. The involvement of children on the streets, in attacks against Israelis, is well-documented and visible to all. What is less evident is that the participation of children has often been actively procured by the Palestinian Authority. In many instances, the Political Guidance Department of the Palestinian Authority has made arrangements for children to leave school

especially for the purpose of taking part in the violent hostilities. The children are referred to in laudatory terms by Yasser Arafat and others within the Palestinian leadership as the "Generals of Stones" who "defeated the IDF Generals".

39. The role of the children is not simply as peaceful demonstrators nor even merely as violent stone throwers. Often, they carry and use weapons. The role of the stone throwers is also to act as human cover for the activities of armed Palestinian elements, such as the Tanzim, who invariably fire at Israelis with live ammunition from within or behind crowds of children. Leaving aside the causes of the conflict and questions of spontaneity, once the violence began it very quickly took on a familiar form, shaped by Fatah declarations and Tanzim organization.

40. This practice of conscripting children does not have universal approval in Palestinian circles. Palestinian mothers are increasingly vocal in their opposition to this element. As reported from Tulkarm on the West Bank in *USA Today* by Matthew Kalman on 8 December 2000, the Tulkarm Women's Union sent a letter of protest to Yasser Arafat demanding that the Palestinian Authority "stop using our children as cannon fodder".

> "Our children are being sent into the streets to face heavily armed Israeli soldiers ... The Palestinian Authority must put an end to this phenomenon. We urge you to issue instructions to your police force to stop sending innocent children to their death."[10]
>
> The report of the mothers' protest continues in the following terms:
>
> " 'We don't want to send our sons to the front line, but they are being taken by the Palestinian Authority,' says Aisheh, 43, a mother of six in the West Bank city of Tulkarm. She says she decided to speak out after

[10] "Let our kids alone, Arafat told", by Matthew Kalman, *USA Today*, 8 December 2000.

her 17-year-old son was hit in the head by a rubber bullet last week. He suffered concussion.

Like other protesting parents, Aisheh declines to allow her full name to be published for fear of reprisals. A nurse from Gaza who spoke out on Palestinian TV against sending children to the flash points was condemned in the Palestinian media as a traitor. Other individuals who refuse to allow their names to be published say they have been threatened by armed Fatah officials for discouraging their children from participating in the clashes.

...

Abu Sharif [a special adviser to Arafat] says Palestinian police are trying to dissuade children from taking part in the clashes with Israeli soldiers. He adds: 'These kids are on the streets. For them, banners and demonstrations are a festival.'

But Aisheh says the militia of Arafat's Fatah movement and the Palestinian security forces provide transportation and encouragement to children eager to answer the call to combat Israel's continued presence on Arab land."[11]

41. The involvement of children continues. Live-fire attacks by Palestinian gunmen operating from within "civilian" groups, including children, remains an accepted Palestinian *modus operandi*. This is clearly prohibited under international human rights and humanitarian law. Israel has already approached the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict[12], the Executive Director of UNICEF[13] and the Chairperson of the Committee on the Rights of the Child[14] on this matter.

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[11] "Let our kids alone, Arafat told", by Matthew Kalman, *USA Today*, 8 December 2000.
[12] Letter of Israel's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, 15 November 2000.
[13] Letter of Israel's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, 27 October 2000.
[14] Letter of Israel's Permanent Representative to to the UN in Geneva, 8 November 2000.

b. Violence Directed Against Israeli Civilians

42. A significant feature of Palestinian policy in the present violence has been the active targeting by Palestinians of Israeli civilians who were in no manner involved in the conflict. This targeting of passive Israeli civilians in their homes, while traveling or while otherwise engaged in civilian pursuits detached from the conflict is a significant point of distinction between the practices of the two sides. Whereas Palestinian civilians injured by Israeli action have by-and-large been actively engaged or caught up in some manner in the confrontation with Israel, Israeli civilians injured in the conflict have in the overwhelming majority of cases been targeted merely because they were Israelis.

43. The pattern of attacks has been disturbing. Israeli residential areas have been the subject of on-going attack, often at night. The repeated attacks on Gilo, a residential neighborhood of Jerusalem, from Beit Jalla are the most clear-cut, but not the only, examples of such incidents. Invariably, these are attacks without warning in which civilians suddenly find themselves the targets, such as by a molotov cocktail thrown through a car window setting a baby on fire; a school teacher murdered on her way to classes, and the list goes on.

44. Perhaps most disturbing, but sadly not unfamiliar, has been the bus and car bomb attacks – the bombing of a children's school bus in Kfar Darom on 20 November 2000; the car bomb attack on a crowded street in Jerusalem on 2 November 2000; the car bomb in Hadera on 22 November 2000. In each case, the attacks were aimed at civilians, including children, and left many dead and wounded.

45. There is an element of brutality in all this. These are not civilians caught up in the cross-fire. These are not civilians actively engaged in some way

in the confrontation. These are simply innocent people targeted because they were Israelis. They were "soft" targets. They were victims of terrorism. Unfortunately, the targeting of such individuals has been an active element of Palestinian policy and practice over recent months.

c. The Use and Failure to Confiscate Illegal Weapons

46. The issue of illegal weapons and the failure by the Palestinian Police to confiscate them as required by the agreements with Israel, is another matter of concern. It should be recalled that the Interim Agreement and subsequent arrangements set agreed limits on both the numbers and types of weapons that could be legally held on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Both elements of these agreements have been breached. Illegal weapons in very significant quantities are held by the Palestinian Police, the Tanzim and other militia, and by the civilian population. These include: pistols, assault rifles and sub-machine guns, machine guns, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles, shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles, cannons and machine guns, mortars, mines, and high explosives.

47. As will by now be well known, one of the significant features of the violence of the past 137 days has been the live-fire attacks by the Palestinian side against Israelis. In many cases, Palestinian Police have participated actively in these attacks. In overwhelming measure, the weapons used by the Palestinians in these attacks have been illegal weapons, illegally held. The stockpiling of illegal weapons and the systematic failure on the part of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Police to fulfill their obligations to confiscate these weapons has been a fundamental element in the groundwork for the present violence.

upper part had been shot at, and the head beaten so badly that it was a pulp, like a red jelly.

I thought he was a soldier because I could see the remains of the khaki trousers and boots. My God, I thought, they've killed this guy. He was dead, he must have been dead, but they were still beating him, madly, kicking his head. They were like animals.

They were just a few feet in front of me and I could see everything. Instinctively, I reached for my camera. I was composing the picture when I was punched in the face by a Palestinian. Another Palestinian pointed right at me shouting 'no picture, no picture!', while another guy hit me in the face and said 'give me your film!'.

I tried to get the film out but they were all grabbing me and the one guy just pulled the camera off me and smashed it to the floor. I knew I had lost the chance to take the photograph that would have made me famous and I had lost my favourite lens that I'd used all over the world, but I didn't care. I was scared for my life.

At the same time, the guy that looked like a soldier was being beaten and the crowd was getting angrier and angrier, shouting 'Allah akbar' – God is great. They were dragging the dead man around the street like a cat toying with a mouse. It was the most horrible thing that I have ever seen and I have reported from Congo, Kosovo, many bad places. In Kosovo, I saw Serbs beating an Albanian but it wasn't like this. There was such hatred, such unbelievable hatred and anger distorting their faces.

The worst thing was that I realised the anger that they were directing at me was the same as that which they'd had toward the soldier before dragging him from the police station and killing him. Somehow I escaped and ran and ran not knowing where I was going. I never saw the other guy they killed, the one they threw out of the window.

I thought that I'd got to know the Palestinians well. I've made six trips this year and had been going to Ramallah every day for the past 16 days. I thought they were kind, hospitable people. I know they are not all like this and I'm a very forgiving person but I'll never forget this. It was murder of the most barbaric kind. When I think about it, I see that man's head, all smashed. I know that I'll have nightmares for the rest of my life."[15]

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[15] Mark Seager, "I'll have nightmares for the rest of my life", *The Sunday Telegraph*, 15 October 2000

51. An Italian film crew was present in the Ramallah police station. It caught on film the unrestrained brutality of the initial attack. The images are horrific. The full sequence has not been released to the public out of sensitivity for the families of the victims and in order not to inflame the situation further. Israel is in possession of additional evidence which portrays the horror of this event, showing how Palestinian police were in active complicity and failed to take any steps to prevent the atrocities.

52. The summary and arbitrary execution, torture and mutilation of the two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah on 12 October 2000 left no-one in doubt about the nature of the threat faced by Israelis. The destructive intent shown by Palestinians to Jewish Holy Sites in areas under Palestinian control further illustrates the violent and aggressive attitudes that appears to underlie the Palestinian attacks. These events have not been a peaceful protest. They have been unrestrained violent attacks of the utmost ferocity, conveying clear signals of the nature of the threat faced by Israelis.

e. Hostile Propaganda and Incitement to Violence

53. In the context of the preceding review of the causes of the violence, reference was made to children's television programmes broadcast on Palestinian television and to books in use in Palestinian schools. The material on these elements is extensive and can be developed in detail. In the context of describing what happened, reference was made to sermons by Muslim clerics during the course of Friday prayers. An extract from one such sermon is shown on the orientation video attached hereto as Exhibit I.[16] This material, too, is extensive and can be developed in detail. Reference has also been made to the training of children at so-called

[16] Exhibit I: *Orientation Video*, at clip n.6.

"summer camps", activities that have as an integral dimension the incitement of children to hatred and violence against Jews and Israelis. A BBC film clip of these camps is included on the orientation video.[17] Finally, reference has been made to Fatah declarations and Hamas communiques which call upon Palestinians to attack Jews and Israelis.

f. The Unwarranted Release of Terrorist Detainees

54. The Palestinian Authority is under an obligation to detain those involved or suspected of involvement in attacks against Israelis. In practice, however, it has pursued a "revolving door" policy, releasing convicted or suspected terrorists soon after arrest. 80 or so were released immediately after the start of the violence. The unwarranted release of persons suspected or found guilty of complicity in acts of violence and terror increased significantly in the period following the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on 25 July 2000 and, to the point of the start of the violence in late September 2000, included the release of over 50 members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") who had been involved in attacks against Israel and Israelis. In very many cases, those released have played an active role in the violence.

55. This unwarranted release of such detainees sends a message to the Palestinian community that terrorism is acceptable, even desirable. More than that, it releases into the community individuals who are committed to pursuing such a course of action and who have the experience and capability to do so. The release of these detainees involves a fundamental breach by the Palestinian Authority of its commitments under the various agreements concluded with Israel, and amounts to active incitement to

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[17] Exhibit I: *Orientation Video*, at clip no 4

terrorism and violence. In freeing these people and enabling and thereby encouraging them to resume their attacks on Israelis, the Palestinian leadership is violating its obligation to provide protection from arbitrary acts of violence aimed at the violation of human rights. This aspect has been completely ignored by the High Commissioner's Report, without any comment.

g. Attacks on and the Destruction of Jewish Holy Sites: Freedom of Religion

56. Under the Agreements between Israel and the Palestinians there is an agreed special status of various Jewish Holy Sites situated within areas under Palestinian control, including notably Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and the Shalom al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho. In the case of these sites, subject to special arrangements allowing for a limited Israeli security presence, their protection and the preservation of Israeli citizens' freedom of religion, was the responsibility of the Palestinian Police. Other sites of importance for present purposes include in particular Rachel's Tomb on the outskirts of Bethlehem.

57. In the case of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, the site was the target of violent attack from the outset by armed militia, including members of the Palestinian Police, accompanied by significant numbers of stone throwers and others. In one such attack, on 1 October 2000, an Israeli border policeman, Madhat Yosef, was severely injured. He subsequently bled to death following the refusal by Palestinian officials to allow his medical evacuation and the decision by Israeli troops to hold back from entering the area to affect a rescue in order not to inflame the situation further.[18]

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[18] The IDF Commander who took the decision not to send in a rescue force subsequently explained the decisions as follows: "If we had sent in tanks and heavy weapons to take out a wounded soldier, it would not only have caused an escalation in events, but imagine how it would look to the rest of the world." (*Jerusalem Post*, 3 October 2000)

58. With a view to reducing tension in the area, an agreement was subsequently reached between the IDF and the Palestinian Police whereby the few Israeli personnel on duty at the site would be withdrawn and the Palestinian Police would ensure the site's continued protection and preservation.

59. Following the withdrawal of the Israeli personnel on 7 October 2000, the site was overrun with the support of the Palestinian Police. The Tomb was set ablaze and severely damaged as Palestinians attempted physically to destroy it stone by stone. Holy relics were burned. The Tomb was painted green, a color holy to Islam, in preparation for turning the site into a mosque. It was only in the face of widespread international condemnation that this egregious violation of religious freedom was halted.

60. A similar situation occurred with the Shalom al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho which was the target of attack on 12 October 2000. The Synagogue was sacked. Holy books and relics were publicly burned. An ancient mosaic was damaged.

61. In the case of Rachel's Tomb, although this is not situated in an area under Palestinian control, it directly abuts the Palestinian city of Bethlehem, an area which is fully under Palestinian jurisdiction. While Israel retains security responsibility for Rachel's Tomb, the constant shooting by Palestinian snipers, rock throwing and general violence in the direction of the Tomb from Palestinian controlled areas has made access to the site impossible.

62. In this review, account must not be left out of the Western Wall, the holiest site of Judaism, situated at the foot of the Temple Mount. Following the outbreak of violence at the Temple Mount on 29 September 2000, the area of the Western Wall was the subject of violent attack by some of the 22,000 members of the congregation at Friday prayers. On the eve of the Jewish

new year, the area of the Western Wall had to be evacuated of Jewish worshippers. Following the attack, the entire area was virtually carpeted in rocks. Again, this matter received no mention in the High Commissioner's Report.

63. The attacks on and destruction of Jewish Holy Sites has been another deeply disturbing element of Palestinian policy and practice in the course of the recent violence. There is no doubt that it has been orchestrated and has had official sanction. These attacks have sent a signal to Israelis and to Jews throughout the world that the Palestinians are not interested in coexisting with Israel. They are not concerned with respecting the freedom of religion of the Jewish worshippers. They are intent on destroying that which is most holy to Judaism. They give tangible expression to the calls, broadcast repeatedly on the Palestinian media for a jihad, a holy war, against the Jews.

h. The Abuse of Protective Symbols and of Accepted Principles Relating to the Relief of the Wounded

64. There have been many allegations throughout this conflict of the abuse of protective symbols and of accepted principles relating to the relief of the wounded. One such case is that just mentioned of the Israeli border policeman who was wounded in the Palestinian attack on Joseph's Tomb in Nablus on 1 October 2000. As a consequence of the refusal by the Palestinian Police to allow his medical evacuation, he bled to death.

65. Israel has been very disturbed by other incidents of a similar nature as well as of the serious abuse by the Palestinian side of the Red Crescent relief symbol. On 31 October 2000, gunfire was directed at the Israeli settlement

of Psagot from inside the Red Crescent building in Ramallah.[19] In other incidents, Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances were used to bring armed Palestinian militia and police to the frontline in the course of gun battles between Palestinian militia and Israeli soldiers. In yet other cases, ambulances carrying the Israeli Magen David Adom (Star of David) symbol have been the target of attack.

i. Conclusions Regarding Palestinian Practices

66. In overview, the policies and practices of the Palestinian side in the present conflict have had a number of significant and highly disturbing features. They have involved significant live-fire attacks by heavily armed militia, at times with support from Palestinian policemen, often from within or behind crowds of stone throwing "civilians", including children. The scope and severity of these attacks have effectively turned the confrontation into an armed conflict. Children have been used quite consciously as part of the campaign." Attacks have been targeted directly at Israeli civilians otherwise entirely uninvolved in the confrontation. Attacks have also exhibited a brutality that has conveyed clear signals of the nature of the threat faced by Israelis. This has been reinforced by the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites.

67. All of these actions amount to violations of basic international human rights and humanitarian norms, violations of the right to life and security of a person, prohibitions against incitement to violence and hatred, and misuse of powers and responsibilities by the Palestinians which have been entrenched in various agreements signed with the Palestinians. Thus, for example, under Article XIX of the *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement*

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[19] See Press Release, 1 November 2000, *IDF Condemns Palestinian Use of Red Crescent Facilities to Shoot at Psagot*

on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians are obliged to exercise their powers and responsibilities with due regard to internationally accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law. Similarly, under Article II (C)(4) of the *Wye River Memorandum*, the Palestinian Police is obliged "to exercise its powers and responsibilities with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law, and be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity and avoid harassment".

68. The groundwork for these actions has been laid, directly or indirectly, over a long period of non-compliance by the PLO and the Palestinian Authority with their obligations under the various agreements with Israel and their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights norms and principles – the use of hostile propaganda and incitement to violence, the military training of young children, the amassing of an armory of illegal weapons, the release of terrorist detainees. Israel has not initiated confrontation. It has responded in self-defence.

Part V

Israeli Policies and Practices

a. General

69. Israel, for its part, has made a sustained effort in pursuit of promoting the peace process in the Middle East, in the belief that a real opportunity had presented itself, that must be seized. Israel did not seek the present confrontation. It was, and continues to be, fomented and sustained by the Palestinian side. Within the severe constraints of the events of recent months, Israel's actions have been directed toward containing the confrontation, protecting persons not directly involved in the conflict and their property, and avoiding causalities to its military and police personnel in the performance of their task. Throughout, Israel has been concerned to minimize serious injury to those actively engaged on the Palestinian side, and to protect civilians who take no part in the hostilities.

70. The key to a balanced appreciation of the circumstances that have prevailed over the past 137 days is that the live-fire dimension of the Palestinian attacks have decisively taken containment of the conflict out of the realm of civilian riot control. For present purposes, the issue is simply that, in the face of live-fire attacks, non-lethal methods of containment cannot be effectively deployed.

71. In the Gaza Strip, most of the major flashpoints of conflict have occurred on roads used by Israeli military forces and Israeli civilians. Attacks by Palestinians have also occurred at and around Israeli communities and around IDF positions. In most cases, the Palestinian attacks have taken place some distance from Palestinian centers of population. The same

pattern has largely been replayed in respect of other points of conflict. Attacks have occurred on roads and at junctions, settlements and IDF positions that in the main have been relatively removed from Palestinian centers of population. Incidents have taken the form of large numbers of Palestinians, frequently armed, traveling to attack small numbers of relatively isolated Israeli civilians or troops. The attacks have not taken the form of peaceful protest or even symbolic stone throwing and protest. They have left the Israeli targets of the attacks in no doubt that, absent firm resistance, their fate was likely to be the same as that of the two Israeli reserve soldiers tortured and arbitrarily executed in Ramallah.

72. In many cases, attacks have been initiated against Israelis from within Palestinian controlled areas. Attackers who have proceeded outside these areas have invariably retreated into these areas subsequently. Given the status of these areas, Israel has not pursued these attackers or been in a position to take effective steps to prevent such attacks.

73. Against this background, the conduct of Israeli forces have been in conformity, and have gone far beyond, with international standards. Indeed, Israel's forces have shown utmost restraint throughout these incidents. Save in exceptional circumstances, Israeli forces – police and military – have not initiated confrontation. They have only acted when confronted by an immediate threat to life or limb as a result of attacks by Palestinians. In so doing, they have acted as mandated by necessity, in self-defence or in the defence of others.

74. The principal exception to the policy of not initiating confrontation has been in specific circumstances in which Israeli forces have acted proportionately in response to a Palestinian attack but have targeted a point distinct from that of the immediate source of the initial Palestinian attack. By way of example for present purposes, Israeli forces attacked the Fatah

confrontations such as those which took place in recent months. In such circumstances, there is a real threat to the lives of military and police personnel. Even assuming that steps can be taken to reduce such threats by the use of protective measures such as body armor, such personnel cannot get within sufficient range to engage in traditional riot control measures.

78. Before leaving this element, it ought to be emphasized that Israel is not seeking to downplay the scale of the casualties in the present conflict. Nor, it must also be emphasized, is Israel suggesting that individual instances of excessive response may not have occurred. To a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack, the equation is not that of the Israeli army versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal equation. A few, often geographically isolated, Israeli troops are under attack by Palestinian militia operating from within a sizeable and invariably extremely violent "civilian" contingent that is intent on causing injury and death.

79. Infractions of Rules of Engagement and codes of conduct are treated severely. Where Israel considers that there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it does so, although given the circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do so routinely. The IDF and the Israeli political establishment do not condone and will not overlook excessive and unreasonable use of force by its troops. At the same time, Israel will not lightly question the judgment of its troops under attack.

80. The issue of alleged unlawful action by Israeli settlers against Palestinians also requires comment. There have been a number of allegations by Palestinians of criminal conduct on the part of Israelis, invariably in the vicinity of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These include attacks on Palestinian vehicles causing personal injury and damage, live-fire attacks against Palestinians resulting in death and injury, and the destruction of property. All such allegations are investigated. Israel will have no truck with criminal activity on the part of its nationals. In a

number of cases to date, suspects have been remanded in custody pending trial.

b. The Use of Force by Israel

81. There are four issues that warrant comment in respect of the use of force by Israel in the context of the present conflict: (i) the shortcomings of non-lethal means of containment, (ii) the means deployed by Israeli forces, (iii) the issue of targeting, and (iv) the use of heavy weapons such as tanks and helicopters. These issues are addressed in turn below.

82. As has been previously mentioned, the present conflict is characterized by live-fire attacks by Palestinian militia, including, often, from elements of the Palestinian Police, against Israeli civilians and civilian targets and Israeli forces. These attacks have involved the use of pistols, assault rifles, sub-machines guns, machine guns, grenades and explosives. There have been around 3,000 such attacks over the course of the conflict in the 137 days since the violence began.

83. The live-fire attacks invariably take place from within or behind groups of "civilians". The usual *modus operandi* of the incidents involves an attack by a sizeable Palestinian contingent against small numbers of Israelis, often geographically isolated. Most of the attacks involve the Palestinian contingent traveling to "engage" their intended Israeli targets. Many of the attacks are brutal in their methods and outcome.

(i) The Shortcomings of Non-lethal Means of Containment

84. A central element of the accusation that has been leveled against Israel is that it did not use – or made insufficient use of – non-lethal means of

containment with the consequence that many Palestinian injuries that might otherwise have been avoided in fact occurred. However, this claim is entirely incorrect. Where possible, Israel has deployed non-lethal means. This has not always been possible. More important is the fact that virtually all of the non-lethal means available are ineffective and unsuitable for use in the kind of conflict prosecuted by the Palestinians. The one exception to this is the use of rubber bullets. These have been widely employed by Israeli forces. However, as the circumstances of the present conflict attest, the use of rubber bullets can in some circumstances be lethal.

85. The nature of the present conflict has posed two related difficulties for Israel in its attempt to contain the violence and minimize casualties. First, the use of live-fire by the Palestinians has effectively meant that Israeli forces have had to remain at some distance from those initiating the violence. Second, the threat of force against Israelis has been a threat of lethal force. Both factors have inhibited the use of traditional methods of riot control. Coupled with this, intrinsic, technical shortcomings or problems associated with the use of available non-lethal means has significantly limited the options open to Israel.

86. In the light of concerns over the possibility of a violent confrontation with the Palestinians, and with the object of avoiding large-scale loss of life and serious injury, Israel has investigated the availability of effective non-lethal means of containment very closely. Israel has come to the conclusion that the available means are either fundamentally unsuited to a live-fire conflict having the characteristics of the present confrontation or that their use poses a substantial risk of death or serious injury such as to preclude deployment. It is the nature of the Palestinian attacks against Israelis that has very largely determined the range of available responses open to Israel. In circumstances in which the use of non-lethal means has been possible

and would be likely to be effective, this option has been followed. The claim, however, that a greater use of non-lethal means by Israel would have been effective either in containing the conflict or in reducing the number of casualties beyond current levels, is not at all based upon actual facts and circumstances.

(ii) The Means Deployed by Israeli Forces

87. An essential characteristic of the present conflict is that Israeli civilians and armed forces have been attacked by Palestinians. In some circumstances, such attacks have been anticipated and it has been possible for Israel to plan defensive measures. In many cases, attacks have not been predictable and it has accordingly been less easy to plan a response. In a few instances, Israel has initiated action in response to a direct attack from the other side.

88. Where it has been possible to anticipate an attack, the circumstances are such that non-lethal means are likely to be an effective response, and where such means have been available to the troops concerned, Israel has employed such means. Overwhelmingly, the non-lethal means used have been tear gas and rubber bullets. As will be appreciated, the use of such means is not free from risk and in many cases injuries have resulted. In the main, such injuries are unlikely to have been life threatening or to have caused any long term disability. Although accurate figures are impossible to come by, independent sources have suggested that around 70% of Palestinian injuries have been caused by the use of rubber bullets (40%) and tear gas (30%).[20] Assuming, for present purposes, the broad accuracy of these percentages, this is consistent with the proposition that Israeli forces have wherever possible used non-lethal means of containment.

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[20] See the December 2000 Report into recent events of the Israeli human rights group *B'Tselem*, at p.6.

89. Where Israeli forces have come under attack and the circumstances have been such that the use of non-lethal means has not been possible – surprise attack, the likely ineffectiveness of non-lethal means, the risk of serious injury by their use, or their lack of availability – they have acted in self-defense by the use of live-fire. The use of such measures has been consistent with the scale of the threat and the nature of the attack. In all cases, IDF activities have been governed by an overriding policy of restraint, the requirement of proportionality and the necessity to take all possible measures to prevent harm to innocent civilians.

(iii) Rules of Engagement and the Issue of Targeting

90. Notwithstanding the fact that the present confrontation is one of armed conflict short of war, the IDF took a decision at an early stage not to significantly revise the rules of engagement that had applied to the operation of Israeli forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to the commencement of the violence. This authorized the use of weapons solely in life-threatening situations or, subject to significant limitations, in the exercise of the arrest of an individual suspected of having committed a grave security offence. This being said, some revision of the rules of engagement was undertaken to reflect the reality of the circumstances faced by Israeli troops. In addition, clarifications were made with regard to the definition of life threatening situations. In all cases, IDF activities have been governed by an overriding policy of restraint, the requirement of proportionality and the necessity to take all possible measures to prevent harm to innocent civilians, pursuant to its obligations under international humanitarian law.

91. Pursuant to its applicable rules of engagements, Israeli troops have responded to those who have initiated attacks against Israeli civilians or

forces or those who have been about to initiate such attacks. In a number of cases, Israel has initiated action against Palestinian command and control positions relevant to the conduct of attacks against Israelis. As previously observed, in a limited number of cases, Israel has focused such action on points geographically distinct from the source of the original attack, an initiative permitted under accepted rules relating to targeting in armed conflict.

92. Two allegations that have been made arising out of the present conflict are that injuries appear frequently to have been caused to the upper body of the injured and that children and others have been killed by the use of rubber bullets. A number of observations on these allegations are warranted. First, it is important to state that Israel has no way of knowing whether these allegations are true and, if they are, the numbers involved in each case. The observations that follow proceed on the assumption, for purposes of this analysis, that the allegations have some basis.

93. Second, the allegation that injuries have been caused to the upper body of those injured forms an essential basis for the claim that Israel has used excessive force; that it has set out to kill or seriously injure the persons concerned.

94. Those who make this allegation have a fundamental lack of appreciation of the circumstances. The reality is that, where such injuries have occurred, they are likely to have occurred in highly fluid situations of extreme threat, involving heavy exchanges of gunfire, often over extended periods, in which the person injured is likely to have been moving actively at the point at which the injury was sustained. To these elements must also be added other complicating factors such as distance, limitations on the accuracy of weapons, etc.

95. With these factors in mind it is incorrect to suggest that injuries sustained to the upper body indicate an intention to kill or cause serious injury. Such injuries illustrate little apart from the severity of the battle in question.

96. Third, as to the allegation that children and others may have been killed by rubber bullets, sadly, this is possible, but not intended. As has already been observed, rubber bullets may be lethal in some circumstances such as at close range or if they strike at particular points on the body.

97. The reality is that rubber bullets are an imperfect means of containment. They are designed to minimize the risk of serious injury but they cannot alleviate it altogether. The reality is that in the overwhelming majority of cases rubber bullets do not cause death or serious injury. In many circumstances, they may be the only available option short of live-fire. Children using guns, or intent on causing injury or death to their intended target by some other means, pose a lethal threat. Particularly when that threat takes the form of large-scale attack, there are few choices when it comes to containment.

98. Fourth, it is worth observing that, in the midst of confrontation, it is often impossible to distinguish older children from adults. This is the hazard of a conflict involving militia forces which operate without uniforms or other distinguishing elements.

(iv) The Use of Heavy Weapons

99. In a few instances, Israel has initiated action in response to a direct attack from the other side. In a limited number of cases the IDF has resorted to the use of helicopters and tanks. These have been exceptional measures, which have invariably followed attacks of particular brutality by the Palestinian side such as the summary and arbitrary execution, torture and

mutilation in Ramallah and the Kfar Darom bus bombing. The attacks were in many cases preceded by warnings for purposes of avoiding injury. Most cases in which tanks have been used have involved the use of so-called "hollow" shells designed to minimize personal injury. A number of observations are warranted about the use of such weapons.

100. First, such weapons are used because of their particular accuracy. In contrast, for example, to the use of aircraft where the potential for damage beyond the immediate confines of the target (so called "collateral damage") is greater, tanks and helicopters are able to pinpoint targets with precision. Their use is therefore designed to minimize injury in circumstances in which a higher scale of response is warranted by the level of the initial Palestinian attack.

101. Second, in many cases, the IDF gave timely and detailed warnings of impending action of this nature with the aim of forestalling personal injury. By-and-large, the intention of such attacks has not been to cause injury. It has been to destroy command and control centers or other military targets and to send a signal of Israeli capability to the Palestinian leadership. In the light of such warnings, many of these attacks have resulted in no or only minimal injury.

102. Examples of actions in which warnings were provided include the helicopter attacks on the Fatah Headquarters in Bet Lahiya on 12 October 2000 and on the police station in Ramallah in which the two Israeli reservists were lynched earlier that day. In both cases, the targets were damaged. There was no loss of life. In another case, the Fatah office in Nablus was attacked on 30 October 2000 following a Palestinian terrorist attack in Jerusalem and the discovery of the body of an Israeli civilian near Gilo. Warnings were given. There was no loss of life.

103. Third, most of the cases in which tanks and helicopters have been used have been in response to on-going live-fire attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians carried out from buildings or other fortified locations. In such circumstances, the use of such weapons is the only effective way in which to respond.

104. Fourth, as regards the use of tanks, in many cases in which this has occurred the ammunition used has been so-called "hollow shells", that is to say, shells in which the charge does not have a radius effect over a wide area therefore minimizing the risk of personal injury. The object of these actions has been to destroy locations from which attacks have taken place with the minimum risk of personal injury.

Part VI

Conclusions

105. The Palestinian resort to violence from late September 2000 was in significant measure the result of an orchestrated campaign by the Palestinian leadership. The immediate objective of this action was to neutralize and counteract the widely held appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the failure of the Camp David negotiations and the virtually uniform international reaction in the run-up to Mr. Arafat's 13 September 2000 deadline for the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state counseling against such a step.

106. More widely, the violence has been part of a nurtured policy of the Palestinian leadership pursued with the deliberate intention of provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative. It also served to alleviate both internal and wider Arab pressures on the Palestinian leadership and re-enlist the support of the Arab world in the Palestinian dispute with Israel. Key elements of Palestinian policies and practices in the course of the present conflict include the live-fire dimension of the conflict, the nature and in many cases the brutality of the attacks, the targeting of Israeli civilians, the initiation of attacks against Israelis from within Palestinian civilian locations, hostile propaganda and incitement to violence, the training and involvement of children, the availability and use of illegal weapons, and the release of terrorist detainees.

107. Not only was the violence nurtured, planned and prosecuted as an instrument of policy by the Palestinian leadership but key elements of the Palestinian security apparatus have actively participated in the violence. The violence, notably in its live-fire dimensions, thus has had all the

characteristics of an armed conflict – live-fire attacks on a significant scale, both quantitatively and geographically; by a well armed and organised militia; under the command of a political establishment; operating from areas outside Israeli control; pursuing political aims.

108. The failure by the Palestinian side to fulfil its human rights and humanitarian obligations – in respect of security; the use of illegally held weapons; the active involvement of elements of the Palestinian Police in attacks on Israelis; the incitement to hatred and violence, including by official Palestinian elements; the destruction of Israeli Holy Sites in areas under Palestinian control; the release from detention of Palestinian terrorists; as well as other actions – violate the very core of the commitments assumed by the Palestinian side in recent years in the context of the peace process, all of which constitute human rights violations. Israel has not initiated confrontation. It has responded in self-defense.

109. Israel's principal concern in the peace process has been the security of its civilians, as is the responsibility of any government. This issue is of overriding importance. The Israeli population has been subject to attack from the earliest days of the State. Often, notably in the case of terror attacks, such incidents have exhibited a dimension of unrestrained brutality. The summary and arbitrary execution, torture and mutilation of the two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah on 12 October 2000 illustrates this. The failure of the Palestinian side to comply with both the letter and the spirit of the security provisions in the various agreements has long been a source of disturbance in Israel. The events of recent months have sharply accentuated these concerns.

110. Of particular relevance in this context, the obligations of the Palestinian side in respect of security and human rights include: a commitment to a peaceful, negotiated process to resolve the conflict between the two sides;

the renunciation of terrorism and violence; action by the Palestinian Police to combat terrorism and violence; protection by the Palestinian Police of those falling within the scope of their jurisdiction; the control of illegal weapons; agreed limitations on Palestinian Police numbers and munitions; the active prevention of incitement to violence and hostile propaganda; action to ensure that the Palestinian educational system does not adversely affect the process of reconciliation; the arrest and prosecution of persons suspected of perpetrating acts of violence, terror and incitement; safeguarding of Jewish Holy Sites in areas under Palestinian control; the operation of joint security and other coordinating committees as a means of effective compliance.

111. Given the recent events, Israel considers it essential that the Palestinian side reaffirm its clearly stated and documented obligations to renounce the use of force in its relations with Israel, as it moves towards an overall settlement of the conflict. The basic commitment underlying the Oslo Process was expressed in the Exchange of Notes between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in which the PLO committed itself "to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides" and declared that "all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations".

112. Israel continues to maintain that there can be no resort to violence in order to solve issues in dispute or further political interests. Measures designed to prevent the use of violence and to apprehend and prosecute individuals involved in incitement and in the perpetration of or conspiracy to commit acts of violence must therefore be enforced. Previously agreed, on-the-ground arrangements, which were specially devised by the two sides to uphold security and to maintain security cooperation and coordination, must therefore be reinstated and reinvigorated.

113. It should be understood that the point of departure for any positive change in relations between Israel and the Palestinians must be the achievement of a durable cessation of violence. In this connection, Israel considers that the Palestinian side must adopt certain concrete steps designed to send a clear message of intent both to the Israeli leadership and the general public. These measures would include the following:

(a) a publicized reaffirmation by the Palestinian leadership, both written and spoken, affirming its commitment to resolve disputes with Israel by peaceful means, including a clear renunciation and denunciation of any recourse to violence and terrorism;

(b) the institution of measures to:

- stop and prevent the para-military training of youth and children;
- collect weapons held in contravention of agreements with Israel;
- return to prison persons involved in terrorist activities against Israel; and
- resume preventive security cooperation with Israel;

(c) an obligation to institute active steps to prevent anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incitement in the media, in places of worship and in educational institutions. These steps must be accompanied by a conscientious attempt to institute and encourage the widespread dissemination of values and principles supporting peaceful resolution of disputes. In this context, it is suggested that both Parties work together to enhance the dialogue and relations between their peoples within the framework of

the People-to-People Programme established under the *Interim Agreement*;

(d) the reduction of the Palestinian Police to the agreed limit of 30,000. There must be both an official and popular cessation of all training of a military nature undertaken by members of the Palestinian Police. The role of this force is solely to maintain internal security and public order, and

(e) a reaffirmation of its commitment to respect the religious beliefs, the worship practices and the Holy Sites of all persons, including the right to enjoy unimpeded access to their Holy Places.

118. The Government of the State of Israel remains committed to seek a lasting and comprehensive peace with its neighbours through direct negotiations. Peaceful negotiations conducted in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect, compromise, communication and reconciliation are key elements to achieve this vision. But for peace to endure, it must be based on two principles: security and reciprocity.

119. Given the above, it is evident that the High Commissioner's Report fails to examine adequately the situation within its appropriate context. Its shortcomings in the assessment concerning Israel's use of force are evident, and the political assertions made therein not only diverge from the task assigned by the High Commissioner's mandate, but also frequently prejudges issues which were agreed between the sides to be dealt with in direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Far from contributing to resumption of peaceful negotiations, Israel is concerned at the fact that the Report is being used to contribute to the

creation of further polarization. In light of the above, it seems regrettable, that the Report of the High Commissioner has in effect become a weapon to achieve political gain, rather than as an instrument which could contribute to the resolution of situation.

VII. LIST OF EXHIBITS

Together with this *Response*, Israel is also submitting the following Exhibit:

Exhibit I - Video: *Orientation to the Present Conflict*

EXHIBIT I: TABLE OF VIDEO CLIPS

Clip	Counter	Date	Source	Location	Description
CHILDREN					
1	00:50	8 October	Palestinian Satellite Channel	Jerusalem	Cry of a young child
2	01:40	27 October	CBS	Ramallah	Interview with a 16 year old youth
3	02:42	13 November	Tulkarm Local Television	Tulkarm	Interview with young children and lynch game
4	05:42	20 November	BBC	Gaza Strip	Children's military style camps
5	07:25	29 November	BBC	Gaza Strip	School song
INCITEMENT					
6	08:30	13 October	Palestinian Satellite Channel	Gaza Strip	Sermon of Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan Mosque, Gaza Strip
7	11:53	30 October	Palestinian Satellite Channel		TV broadcaster calling for preparations to be made
VIOLENCE					
8	13:17	2 October	Palestinian Satellite Channel	IDF Post, Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip	Violent protests against IDF post
9	14:12	3 October	NBC	Gaza Strip and Nablus	Palestinian violence
10	14:41	6 October	BBC	Jerusalem	Israeli policemen trapped in a police station in the Old City of Jerusalem
11	15:41	12 October	Al-Jazira Satellite Channel	Gaza Strip	Demonstration
12	16:16	12 October	BBC	Ramallah	Lynch
13	17:27	14 October	CNN	Gaza Strip	Violent Demonstration
14	18:09	26 October	CNN	Gaza Strip	Suicide bomber at Kfar Darom IDF military post
15	18:35	27 October	CBS	Ramallah	Interview with Marwan Barghouti

WEAPONS					
16	21:45	12 October	Al-Jazira Satellite Channel	Jelazun Refugee Camp	Illegal weapons, including anti-tank missile
17	22:05	12 October	Palestinian satellite Channel	Gaza Strip	Demonstration with illegal weapons
18	22:37	17 October	CBS	West Bank	Parade with illegal weapons
19	23:09	26 October	BBC	West Bank	Suicide bombers
DESECRATION OF HOLY SITES					
20	23:35	7 October	CNN	Joseph's Tomb	Desecration of Joseph's Tomb
TERROR					
21	24:22	20 October	BBC	Mount Eyval	Shooting on Israeli tourists
22	24:44	2 November	BBC	Jerusalem	Car bomb in Mahane Yehuda Market - Jerusalem
23	25:13	13 November	CNN	Ramallah	Shots at civilian car
24	25:48	20 November	IBA	Kfar Darom	Bombing of children's school bus
25	26:19	20 November	BBC	Gilo	Damage to private apartment in Gilo
26	26:41	22 November	BBC	Gaza Strip	Israeli civilian killed in his car at a junction near Kfar Darom
27	26:58	23 November	BBC	Hadera	Car bomb against bus in Hadera
28	27:30	23 November	BBC	Psagot	Shots in kitchen window of private apartment in Psagot
29	28:03	17 November	BBC	Sharm El-Sheikh	Statement of US President Clinton at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit

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General Assembly

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Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 18
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

Letter dated 21 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*

With a view to the consideration by the Security Council, at the end of this month, of the question of Western Sahara and the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and following the issue of your most recent report on the question of Western Sahara, I should like to share with you, on behalf of Algeria, an observer State to the process of implementation of the Settlement Plan, the following comments:

1. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1324 (2000) of 30 October 2000, the two parties, under the auspices of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, will continue to try to resolve the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the Settlement Plan and try to agree upon a mutually acceptable political solution to their dispute over Western Sahara.

Consequently, the United Nations, which has a duty to make efforts in the two directions specified by the Security Council, may under no circumstances give preference to one alternative over the other, much less favour the quest for "a mutually acceptable political solution" over the implementation of the Settlement Plan and the Houston Accords, which have the unanimous support of the international community.

2. In your report on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2000/1029) of 25 October 2000, you stated that if the progress you and your Personal Envoy hoped to make in your quest for a "mutually acceptable political solution" had not materialized during the next extension of the mandate of MINURSO, the Mission should begin hearing the pending appeals from the identification process on an expedited basis, without regard as to how long it might be expected to take to complete them (para. 31).

* Also issued under the symbol S/2001/155.

01-26078 (E) 220201 220201

Since your most recent report, which has just been submitted to the Security Council, apparently does not reveal any such progress, MINURSO should logically begin an immediate hearing of the pending appeals from the identification process, thereby resuming the implementation of the Settlement Plan that was accepted on 30 August 1988 by the two parties and approved by the Security Council through its resolutions 658 (1990) and 690 (1991) of 27 June 1990 and 29 April 1991, respectively, as being the only framework for a just and lasting solution to the dispute.

The international community has all the more right to expect the United Nations to act promptly to implement the Settlement Plan in view of the General Assembly's further reiteration of the full validity of the Plan at its fifty-fifth session and the fact that the Security Council has constantly expressed — most recently in its resolution 1324 (2000) of 30 October 2000 — its full support for the continued efforts exerted by MINURSO to implement the Settlement Plan and agreements adopted by the parties.

3. Algeria believes that the question of the appeals — whose hearing modalities were agreed by the two parties in the identification and appeals protocols concluded in May 1999 in New York under United Nations auspices, and which represent the last obstacle before the commencement of the interim period leading up to the referendum — should and can be settled if the United Nations decides to take a firm stand and mobilize the necessary human and financial resources.

Algeria believes that, if it is conducted quickly, effectively and rigorously, the appeals process can be carried out within a reasonable period of time. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat should be able to provide prompt, useful and precise guidelines on the duration of this process.

4. My country, which has never stinted in its support for you, your Personal Envoy or your Special Representative in your efforts towards the implementation of the Settlement Plan and the holding of a free, fair and impartial referendum, with a view to the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, would like to reiterate its belief that there is no other just and lasting way to settle the question of Western Sahara than the one based on international law, that is, on the free expression by the Saharan people of their inalienable right to self-determination.

5. Algeria, which attaches the greatest importance to the full collaboration of the two parties with you, your Personal Envoy and your Special Representative, urges them to continue such collaboration in order to implement the various phases of the Settlement Plan with a view to the holding of the long-awaited referendum as soon as possible.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 18.

(*Signed*) Abdallah **Baali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/55/802–S/2001/164

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 40
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 21 February 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters on the same subject, I have the honour to convey to you hereunder a list of the violations and infringements that were committed by Israel against Lebanon in the period from 1 to 15 February 2001. Lebanon regards these incidents as an extension of Israel's aggression against its people and territory.

1 February 2001

Between 0950 and 1125 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at various altitudes, breaking the sound barrier. The fraternal forces stationed in the vicinity of Qulay'at air base sounded the warning sirens.

Between 1210 and 1315 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at the surrounding area. Two Israeli helicopters also flew over the Shab'a farmlands.

At 1220 hours there was an explosion of unknown origin inside the Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1800 and 1825 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the Shab'a farmlands.

2 February 2001

Between 2115 and 2240 hours Israeli forces fired several 120-mm mortar rounds at the Birkat al-Naqqar vicinity in an outlying area of Shab'a, in the liberated territories, from one of their outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

01-26238 (E) 280201 060301

3 February 2001

Between 1620 and 1630 hours Israeli forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the surrounding area.

4 February 2001

Between 2000 and 2015 hours Israeli forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the surrounding area.

5 February 2001

Between 1035 and 1050 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Naqurah area at very high altitudes.

Between 1245 and 1415 hours Israeli warplanes flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands at very high altitudes.

6 February 2001

Between 1400 and 1425 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Zahrani and Tyre areas at very high altitude.

At 2030 hours an Israeli gunboat in the territorial waters of the occupied territories off Ra's al-Naqurah launched an illumination flare over the same offshore area.

7 February 2001

Between 1550 and 1615 hours Israeli forces fired six 120-mm mortar rounds at the Birkat al-Naqqar vicinity in an outlying area of Shab'a, in liberated Lebanese territory, from one of their outposts in the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

8 February 2001

Between 1420 and 1445 hours Israeli enemy forces fired five 120-mm mortar rounds from the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands. Four tank shells impacted at Sawwanah hill in an outlying area of Shab'a, in liberated territory.

At 1540 hours Israeli enemy forces at the same outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at the surrounding area.

At 2300 hours Israeli forces launched an illumination flare over Al-Sha'b al-Kasir hill in the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

10 February 2001

Between 0925 and 1005 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands and the Jazzin area at very high altitude.

Between 1130 and 1230 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the central Bekaa area as far as Ba'labakk before heading south.

Between 1920 and 1925 hours Israeli enemy forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the surrounding area.

11 February 2001

Between 1150 and 1210 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Bekaa, the North and Mount Lebanon at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier. They were engaged in the South by the Army's L-11 ground-based anti-aircraft units. An Israeli reconnaissance aircraft also flew over the Naqurah area at very high altitude.

Between 1140 and 1205 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1640 and 1730 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Marj Uyun and Nabatiyah areas at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1730 and 1740 hours an Israeli helicopter flew over the occupied Shab'a farmlands before leaving in the direction of the occupied territories.

At 2000 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the Abbad border area.

12 February 2001

Between 2030 and 2115 hours extensive movements by Israeli military vehicles were seen in the Hadab area inside the occupied territories opposite the towns of Yarun and Marun al-Ras.

Between 2125 and 2135 hours Israeli forces at their Ramta hill outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at the surrounding area.

13 February 2001

Between 1250 and 1310 hours Israeli enemy forces at their Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire and launched three smoke bombs at the surrounding area.

Between 1900 and 1940 hours there were two explosions of unknown origin in the occupied Shab'a farmlands. An Israeli helicopter then flew over the farmlands before leaving in the direction of the occupied territories.

Between 1815 and 2000 hours Israeli enemy forces carried out a military exercise in the occupied Shab'a farmlands in which light and medium automatic weapons and artillery shells were used. Helicopters and a reconnaissance aircraft also took part.

14 February 2001

In the morning Israeli enemy forces installed two monitoring cameras at the Nabi Uwaydah intersection near the Blue Line between Kafr Killa and Udaysah.

At 2030 hours Israeli forces at the Ra's al-Naqurah position launched five illumination flares over the surrounding area.

Like the previous Israeli violations of which it represents a continuation, this latest series is in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and of Lebanon's sovereignty and poses a threat to stability in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sélim **Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/55/803

General Assembly

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Agenda items 116 and 126

Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the inspection of the consolidation of technical support services in the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services

Note by the Secretary-General

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 48/218 B and 54/244, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit, for the attention of the General Assembly, the attached report, conveyed to him by the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, on the review of the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services.

2. The Secretary-General takes note of its findings and concurs with its recommendations, and notes that measures are being taken to correct the issues addressed in the review.

01-26314 (E) 070301

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the inspection of the consolidation of technical support services in the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services

Executive summary

The inspection found that the establishment of the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services (DGAACS) has enhanced the efficiency of the services that are provided to Member States. The technical secretariats of most of the intergovernmental and expert bodies based in New York have been consolidated in one Department. Meetings scheduling and document processing are now part of a coordinated process in which demands and priorities are balanced under the guidance of a single Department head. The streamlining of technical support services has also reduced the time-consuming interdepartmental consultations of previous years. This has allowed for improved planning in the allocation of services and facilities, and resulted in a more rational use of resources.

Although the consolidation of staff resources has enhanced work flows within and among servicing units and offices, continuous high-level collaboration between DGAACS and other departments is needed to further clarify the technical and substantive functions.

In addition to enhanced coordination resulting from the integration of conference services at the United Nations Office at Geneva and the United Nations Office at Vienna into DGAACS, a new level of consultation and cooperation has developed among conference services managers at all duty stations, including the United Nations Office at Nairobi and the regional commissions.

In conjunction with the consolidation of technical services, the programme budget for 1998-1999 reflected a reduction of some 80 posts in DGAACS and a decrease of approximately 10 per cent in the Department's requirements for temporary assistance for meetings in the 2000-2001 programme budget. However, due to unanticipated and substantial increases in the demand for services, expenditures on temporary assistance in the current biennium have exceeded estimates. Consultation and cooperation between headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna with regard to the preparation of budget proposals and the reporting on resource utilization should be strengthened to ensure the most cost-effective utilization of conference services.

Most of the changes introduced in operating procedures in conference services have resulted from the use of information technology. More investments are needed to meet the growing needs of the Department, and institutionalized staff training in the use of new technologies should also be a priority of the Department.

At present, measures to appropriately assess individual staff performance are insufficient because the Secretariat-wide performance appraisal system has yet to be fully implemented throughout the Department.

It is important for the Department to ensure that the services it provides meet the expectations of Member States. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) notes that the Department's performance in different areas is considered regularly in

intergovernmental bodies, mainly the Committee on Conferences and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. DGAACS also needs to introduce other feedback mechanisms, such as surveys, which should be routinely undertaken to enable DGAACS to continuously assess and improve the quality of the services it provides.

In the light of the above conclusions, the inspection made 10 recommendations that were accepted by the management of DGAACS.

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I. Introduction

1. In a letter dated 17 March 1997 addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/51/829), the Secretary-General stated that a priority in the reform effort was to strengthen the coherence, quality and efficiency of the technical support services provided by the Secretariat to intergovernmental bodies. The Secretary-General added that there was a need to streamline and strengthen technical support for intergovernmental processes relating, in particular, to technical support for the General Assembly and its main and subsidiary bodies, and similar support for the Economic and Social Council and other intergovernmental bodies in the economic and social fields, as well as the functions of conference services machinery. He believed that the integration of these activities into one department would markedly strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat to provide efficient and integrated technical support to Member States while providing opportunities for significant savings.

2. The Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services (DGAACS) was subsequently established by the Secretary-General in 1997, in the context of his management reform measures. The major objectives of the newly created Department were, inter alia, (a) to ensure, through the provision of authoritative advice and substantive services, the orderly and procedurally correct conduct of the meetings and other work of the General Assembly and its General, First, Second, Third and Fourth Committees; and (b) to provide to intergovernmental and expert bodies the high-quality meeting and documentation services that they require to carry out their work, making the most cost-effective use of conference-servicing resources and facilities worldwide. The activities concerning General Assembly affairs and the secretariat servicing of decolonization organs, as well as the servicing of the First Committee, which was previously undertaken by the Department of Political Affairs, the technical secretariat servicing of the Economic and Social Council, which was previously provided by the former Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, and the conference services component of the former Office of Conference and Support Services in the Department of Management were incorporated in the new Department, under section 1B of the programme budget for 1998-1999 (see A/52/303, paras. 1B.1 and 1B.2).

3. The Secretary-General anticipated that the new Department (for the organization chart, see annex III) would establish a new way of operating conference services in the Secretariat that would ensure increased accountability for performance against clear norms and standards of quality and timeliness, as well as increased flexibility to deploy resources to respond quickly to the needs of intergovernmental bodies. The consolidation of technical support services in the new Department was therefore considered an important means of achieving efficiency, cost-effectiveness and appreciable administrative savings.

II. Objectives of the inspection

4. In order to assess how the establishment of DGAACS and the consolidation of technical support services in the new Department contributed to the Secretary-General's overall reform objectives, the inspection sought to (a) review the services being provided by DGAACS and analyse feedback from client departments and intergovernmental bodies to ascertain the level of satisfaction with the services being provided; (b) assess the administrative savings that have accrued from the consolidation; (c) review the staffing situation to ascertain the level of flexibility to deploy the resources allocated to the new Department to carry out its functions; and (d) examine the internal oversight mechanisms in place, including programme monitoring methods, to ascertain how they work towards strengthening the efficiency of DGAACS processes.

III. Methodology

5. The methodology for the inspection involved (a) a review of relevant documents and reports by the General Assembly and the Secretary-General on the reform and creation of DGAACS, the Department's medium-term plans and budget documents, as well as departmental/internal issuances on the strengthening of the new Department's functions; (b) interviews with senior managers and staff of DGAACS, as well as senior managers of client departments and delegates; (c) a focus group discussion, involving senior managers and staff of DGAACS and senior managers

of client departments; and (d) a survey of all missions to the United Nations to obtain their views on the technical services provided to them by DGAACS (see annex I). Throughout the course of the inspection, OIOS received the fullest cooperation from DGAACS staff and management.

IV. Findings

A. Strengthening of the coherence, quality and efficiency of the technical support services provided by DGAACS to Member States

1. Effects of consolidation

6. OIOS found that the new Department has made great strides in meeting the above objective. What was once a competition for services and for priority in meetings scheduling and document processing, which often involved high-level intervention, is now a coordinated process in which demands and priorities are balanced in a collegial context under the guidance of the Department head.

7. The inspection confirmed that the improved flow of information has created a better understanding of demand and has allowed for improved planning in the allocation of services and facilities, resulting in a more efficient use of staff resources and a higher degree of user satisfaction. Furthermore, coherence has been improved as a result of the fact that the staff of previously separate servicing units have become aware of the different structures, practices and working methods in the new Department. This, in turn, has led to a better understanding of how an event, such as a special session, conference or resolution, develops from inception to completion.

8. The inspection team took note of the fact that the consolidation did not include all the technical services provided to intergovernmental bodies. In paragraph 8 of section III of its resolution 52/220, the General Assembly had indicated that the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services would not undertake the servicing of the Fifth and Sixth Committees of the Assembly and the Security Council. In the same resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to keep those arrangements under review and to submit a report in that regard to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session. The Secretary-General, in his report to the Assembly at its fifty-third session, stated that given that the current arrangements for the provision of substantive, technical and conference servicing to all intergovernmental and expert bodies appeared to meet the requirements of Member States, no change was proposed at that time, and that the Assembly would be informed of any plans for further developments in that field (see A/53/452, para. 10).

9. The inspection team observed that discussions are continuing between DGAACS and the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) with respect to the provision of technical services related to disarmament issues. OIOS was provided with copies of correspondence documenting the attempts by the Under-Secretaries-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services and for Disarmament Affairs to clarify the division of functions with regard to servicing disarmament-related meetings, as contained in their respective organizational structures. OIOS noted that the respective revised medium-term plans for 1998-2001 for DDA and DGAACS (see A/53/6/Rev.1) contained provisions that further clarified the division of functions between the two Departments.

10. However, OIOS learned that at the operational level, misunderstandings and complaints from the staff concerned about the current arrangement continue, which judging from the correspondence provided to OIOS have affected the efficient delivery of technical services on disarmament issues. It is important for both DGAACS and DDA to correct that situation, which runs counter to the objective of the smoother functioning of the disarmament bodies concerned.

2. Documents processing

11. With regard to documentation, OIOS found that DGAACS efforts to increase consultation and coordination among the various units have led to a more rational scheduling of meetings of the various intergovernmental bodies, resulting in more timely consideration of agenda items and improved availability of parliamentary documents. The creation of the Documentation Programming and Monitoring Unit (DPMU), which serves as a central clearing house for documents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, ensures a better overall coordination and rationalization of documentation.

12. Despite the significant efforts to improve document processing, the Department continues to chase author departments for their submissions to ensure the availability of documents for meetings and conferences. OIOS shares the DPMU concern that it is incumbent upon author departments directly responsible for substantive servicing of meetings to provide delegates with documents in a timely manner that would allow sufficient time to consult capitals and to better prepare for discussions in the intergovernmental bodies.

13. Over the years, the General Assembly has pressed for ways to resolve delays in availability of documentation. In its resolution 47/202, the Assembly urged the substantive departments to comply with the rule requiring submission of pre-session documents to DGAACS at least 10 weeks before the beginning of sessions in order to allow adequate time for processing in all languages. To determine progress achieved in this connection, OIOS reviewed the status of pre-session documentation for the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly (see annex II). As of 14 July 2000, the total number of registered pre-session documents for the fifty-fifth session was 436, of which the Department received only 114 on time. The situation has clearly not improved and therefore deserves immediate attention.

14. In November 1997, the President of the General Assembly drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the problem of untimely submission of documentation by some substantive departments of the Secretariat to the main committees of the General Assembly. In response to the complaints received, the Office of the Secretary-General requested all substantive departments to designate a focal point to serve as primary contact for document submission to DGAACS. OIOS confirmed that DGAACS has been following through with this directive. DPMU convenes "plenary" focal point meetings two or three times a year to reiterate the requirements outlined by the General Assembly.

15. In its resolution A/54/248, section C, on the pattern of conferences, the General Assembly stated that if a report was submitted late to Conference Services, the reasons for the delay should be included in a footnote to the document. The Department reminded focal points of author departments in a 27 January 2000 meeting about the importance of implementing that instruction, and lamented that compliance by author departments was far from satisfactory. OIOS considers the timely submission of documents for processing to be the shared responsibility of all departments concerned.

16. The inspection team was informed that, in response to a request made by the General Assembly in its resolution 54/248, DGAACS had developed several proposals for improving the timely issuance of pre-session documentation. While some of them could be implemented by the Secretariat, the others require action by intergovernmental organs. The former proposals include holding documentation planning meetings three months prior to the opening of a session, at which the substantive department concerned, the servicing secretariat and the documents monitoring and control units would review documentation forecasts, bearing in mind the 10-week rule for submission and the six-week rule for issuance. Decisions on the volume and dates of submission of documentation could be taken at these meetings, giving full consideration to projected processing capacity. The latter category include proposals to (a) minimize the impact of late submissions on the timely issuance of documents submitted on time by applying a modified "first come, first served" approach, that is, restricting the rescheduling of work necessary to accommodate late arrivals to documents submitted by the same Department for the same body; (b) request intergovernmental organs to consider receiving recurrent reports quarterly or biannually instead of annually, which would allow for shorter documents that could be produced more speedily; (c) authorize the early issuance of partial reports even when all the relevant information is not yet available, to be followed later by addenda with additional information; and (d) invite intergovernmental bodies to review the status of preparation of documentation when organizing their sessions and to adjust their programmes of work, as appropriate, in cases of unavoidable late submission. OIOS notes that those four proposals were welcomed by the Committee on Conferences at its substantive session of 2000, but that they were not adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session. In connection with documentation issues, OIOS also reviewed the functions of the Document Planning and Monitoring Unit and the Documents Control Section of DGAACS, and is of the view that they could be enhanced by strengthening the structural links between the two units. Consideration could be given to locating both within a common organizational framework.

17. The Department's continuing efforts to cope with the demand for services within existing resources and to ensure the overall functioning of the intergovernmental machinery are commendable. However, the inspection team observed that delays in document submissions have continued to adversely affect the smooth functioning of conference services. To further address the problem, OIOS is of the view that a Secretariat-wide initiative should be undertaken at the level of department heads to exert pressure on programme managers to streamline their overall documentation preparation, as well as to formalize the best practices that would alleviate late submissions. The Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services needs to brief the Secretary-General's senior management group regularly on the status of documentation processing, highlighting the cost to the Organization of gridlocks in processing documents and the attendant meetings services. The viability of further formalizing the "first come, first served" approach for documents processing, taking into account document size and other relevant factors peculiar to each author department, should also be considered. It should be noted that two thirds of the Member States responding to the question regarding which areas of DGAACS work needs improvement mentioned the timeliness of documentation. Finally, OIOS was appalled to learn that there are departments that continue to submit documents in hard copy only rather than electronically. OIOS urges DGAACS to expedite movement to a fully electronic system of documentation submission and processing, to achieve efficiency gains in documents processing and enable on-screen editing of documents.

B. Streamlining technical support services for intergovernmental processes

18. The inspection confirmed that the combination in one division of DGAACS of the secretariats of the General Assembly plenary and four of its main committees, as well as the Economic and Social Council and its New York-based subsidiary bodies has improved coordination, and the time-consuming interdepartmental consultations of previous years have been greatly minimized. The consolidation of staff resources has enabled programme managers to assign tasks, as they arise, to available units or offices across the board, overcoming the strict division of responsibilities of the past.

19. In addition to the organizational entities cited in paragraph 2 above, the conference services entities at the United Nations Offices at Geneva (UNOG) and Vienna (UNOV) have also become part of the new Department. In the context of its review of the medium-term plans at its fortieth session, the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) made reference to General Assembly resolution 54/248 and underlined that conference services at the United Nations Office in Nairobi should be included in the overall orientation of DGAACS. The General Assembly endorsed that recommendation in its resolution 55/234. In that context, the Department informed OIOS that a new level of consultation, coordination and cooperation has already developed among the conference services managers at the four duty stations. OIOS learned that conference services at the regional commissions have also expressed eagerness to be included in a Secretariat-wide approach to conference servicing.

20. OIOS was informed that although there are regular, often daily, contacts between DGAACS officials in New York with their counterparts in UNOG and UNOV, the respective responsibility and authority of the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services and the Directors-General of UNOG and UNOV concerning the operations, staff and resources of conference services has not been clearly defined. In fact, concern was expressed about the lack of control by New York over the financial resources at the other duty stations. OIOS noted stipulations in the programme budget for 2000-2001 that:

> "The USG for DGAACS is also responsible for conference services in Geneva and Vienna. This arrangement will allow the management of conference-servicing resources in all three duty stations in an integrated manner, with a view to achieving the *most efficient utilization* of the resources. [emphasis added] Therefore, the conference-servicing resources in Geneva and Vienna will continue to be budgeted under this section (2)." (see A/54/6/Rev.1)

21. In the view of OIOS, both the organization manual and the programme budget approved by the General Assembly have clearly defined the responsibility of the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services and it is therefore incumbent upon him to firmly establish

the parameters of his authority and corresponding responsibility, in consultation with the Directors-General of UNOG and UNOV. Such parameters should be set forth in a formal memorandum of understanding between the parties concerned and circulated to all heads of organizational units in New York, Geneva and Vienna (and Nairobi). The arrangement should include consultation between New York, Geneva and Vienna on the preparation of the biennial budget proposals and the utilization of financial resources. Furthermore, to better rationalize the use of conference services worldwide and reduce expenditures on temporary assistance for meetings, the Under-Secretary-General should request DGAACS heads of services to work with Documents Control to further strengthen the sharing of work with offices away from Headquarters.

C. Achieving significant administrative savings

22. The Secretary-General indicated in his proposed reform measures that this exercise would result in the reduction of posts in the programme budget for the biennium 1998-1999. The distribution of new posts as well as reclassifications and posts proposed for abolition were described in his report to the General Assembly (A/52/303). The programmatic and financial implications of the actions and recommendations relating to the consolidation of entities within the Secretariat to support the work of the legislative bodies and conferences of the Organization into a single department were also reflected therein.

23. In that connection, the senior management of DGAACS informed OIOS that at the end of 1997, a few months after the establishment of the new Department, its staffing table was reduced by about 80 posts at Headquarters. Although it could be argued that those reductions were not the result of the consolidation but rather caused by the savings mandated at that time, senior management maintained that, to some degree, the reductions in posts were made possible by the consolidation of units in the new Department. Furthermore, the former Conference Services Unit of the Executive Office of the Department of Management, which became the Executive Office of DGAACS, absorbed increased responsibilities without any additions to its staff. In addition, as a result of the improved planning brought about by the enhanced coordination and cooperation among the technical secretariats as well as with conference services, DGAACS was able to reduce its requirements for temporary assistance for meetings by about 10 per cent, i.e., US$ 3.9 million in the 2000-2001 budget. However, OIOS was informed that owing to a substantial increase in the demand for services in 2000, expenditures on temporary assistance have exceeded estimates.

D. Establishing a new way of operating conference services with increased accountability for performance against clear norms and standards of quality and timeliness, and increased flexibility to deploy resources to respond quickly

1. Information technology

24. The Secretary-General recognized the importance of the new information technologies to improve work processes when he clearly stated in his reform proposals that advances in information and communications technology could modernize how documents in the United Nations were produced, stored and distributed, and could offer documents of higher quality, and at lower cost, yet reaching a vastly broader audience in every Member State, and that advances in information technology were the basis for increases in the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of both substantive programmes and management of the United Nations.

25. OIOS learned that most of the changes introduced in operating procedures in conference services have resulted from the use of more advanced technology, including:

(a) An electronic documents registration and information tracking system (eDrits) to keep track of all jobs for translation, typing and printing. OIOS was informed that, once the conditions required for making electronic submission of documents the accepted standard have been met, the eDrits can be upgraded to also become a vehicle for the electronic distribution of jobs;

(b) A computer-assisted assignment programme to facilitate the automatic assignment of interpreters to meetings, to support planning and the assignment of administrative tasks in the Interpretation Service and to keep managerial and statistical data. In making the

programme year 2000 compliant and moving it from a WANG to a PC-based environment, considerable efficiencies had been realized. The system reduces the time it takes to prepare interpreter assignments and to respond effectively to scheduling changes, and helps to optimize the use of resources and the recruitment of temporary staff;

(c) A digital recording system for meetings, which is replacing the old analog-based system and has made it possible to use off-site verbatim reporting as a partial replacement of the much more expensive servicing modality based on the use of non-local temporary assistance, thus leading to economies in travel and daily subsistence allowance that can be estimated at US$ 150,000 per year. That innovation was recognized by a UN 21 award (an award from the Secretary-General to staff for efforts towards making the United Nations a better and more efficient organization);

(d) Computer-assisted translation (CAT), which automates the retrieval of prepared reference material, thus facilitating and improving the quality of translations. Unfortunately, delays in developing an upgraded version of the software acquired have resulted in delays in training and the introduction of the technology. Currently, 48 licences have been procured;

(e) A voice recognition project based on specialized commercial software, which by converting direct or recorded dictation to text in standard United Nations word-processing format (MS-Word) can reduce cassette transcription workloads in text-processing units. Software for English, French, Spanish and Chinese has been evaluated and 400 licences are under procurement. Software for Arabic is still being tested; currently there is none commercially available for Russian;

(f) A new computerized inventory system for sales publications, designed to allow tighter control of stock and better decision-making when determining print runs.

26. The above indicates clearly that DGAACS has taken action to apply information technologies to its work processes. However, both staff and management have noted that the current investments in information technologies have fallen short of expectations. OIOS was informed that although the Information Management and Technology Unit has recently developed special computer tools and software to facilitate the production, storage and distribution of documents, the resources allocated to the Department for information technology (IT) purposes are not commensurate with its size and the services it provides. A review of the Department's budget for 2000-2001 showed that it has allocated US$ 4,009,700 for IT, which represents 1.53 per cent of its total regular budget. OIOS considered this allocation for information technology to be rather inadequate, considering the potential for improving internal processes and service delivery through the use of information technologies.

27. OIOS also noted that some of the IT projects that need immediate attention include (a) the development of computer-based systems for the planning and scheduling of meetings, which would facilitate these functions and improve coordination among all Secretariat units involved in the provision of services; (b) the strengthening of internal application implementation/customization through regular training; (c) combined efforts in automation with other duty stations so as to ensure better service coordination between New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi; (d) a biennial IT change management work plan/software portfolio; and (e) wiring of interpretation booths for LAN access so as to assist interpreters with terminology and language resources. Management responded that "*While we would agree that we are far from the desired results in the automation of meetings planning and scheduling tasks, progress is being made in this area. Work is also being done to ensure better coordination between the various duty stations, as witnessed by the discussion at a meeting of conference services managers held at Headquarters in July 2000*".

2. Other improvements

28. Non-technical changes include steps taken to ensure that the rates of self-revision do not reach a level that might compromise quality of translations and the reorganization of the official records editing process to improve prioritization. The latter, initiated several years ago, resulted in significant savings through the use of desk-top publishing technology, which obviates the need for external typesetting and printing of certain language versions and very significantly shortens production cycles; thus, the book of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session was issued five months earlier than would have been the case under the previous

production system, and within the same time-frame as the book of resolutions for the fifty-third session, although it contained over 25 per cent more material, including information on sponsors and voting. The editorial production team was given a UN 21 award for this project. Most of these developments have been documented in reports to the General Assembly and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and presentations on efficiency gains (see A/55/134 and A/AC.172/2000/5).

3. Standards for performance measurement

29. In the DGAACS programme management plan for 2000, a major goal was to enhance the quality of the services it provides. Line managers at all levels are required not only to deliver the volume of services requested by Member States but also to seek ways to enhance the quality of their outputs. To that end, weekly senior management meetings are held to review the performance of the Department and develop responses to specific issues. Weekly divisional meetings follow up on the decisions taken. DGAACS informed OIOS that overall performance analyses of its work have focused mainly on capacity utilization, with emphasis on quality control at the unit level. It disclosed that the diverse nature of its functions has required it to implement a variety of quality control mechanisms, ranging from straightforward revisions of in-house translations, spot-checking of contractual translations and monitoring of interpretation to peer review and unit critique sessions or discussions. Fluctuations in workload or output statistics are closely monitored to determine demand/capacity ratios to ensure that a high level of productivity is maintained. However, set criteria that would measure the quality of the services against established standards are not in place in each of the operational units. This is an area requiring the immediate attention of DGAACS.

4. Operating guidelines

30. OIOS also observed that DGAACS does not have operating guidelines in all its sections/units. OIOS views the absence of such operating guidelines as a serious management problem that, if not corrected, could curtail further efficiency gains and could also lead to the loss of institutional memory as a result of the movement or departure of staff. Given its very specific servicing functions, DGAACS programme managers need to take the necessary steps to institutionalize operating guidelines throughout the Department.

5. Client feedback

Client departments

31. Although complaints from end-users received by DGAACS are immediately examined and corrective actions implemented, where necessary, OIOS considers this approach to be reactive rather than proactive. Systematic feedback mechanisms have not been established to gauge client satisfaction. The Department maintained that subsidiary bodies are being provided with a better understanding of the procedures of their parent bodies, and also that the cooperation between the secretariats of the subsidiary and parent bodies has improved the quality of committee reports. OIOS reviewed samples of letters from delegations to the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies, praising DGAACS for the high quality of its servicing.

32. Some senior managers argued that there is no need for any formalized feedback mechanisms in the Department in view of the fact that the Committee on Conferences, the subsidiary body of the General Assembly that oversees DGAACS, devotes a substantial part of its annual session to the review of various aspects of the work of DGAACS. They maintained that reports on the utilization of conference facilities resources, timeliness in the availability of documentation and other substantive issues are regularly submitted to the Committee, which often makes comments and recommendations with a view to ensuring qualitative improvements in the Department's work. Further, they argued that during the annual consideration of the agenda item on the pattern of conferences, the Fifth Committee also reviews conference-servicing activities, and many delegations take advantage of the occasion to express their views on the quality of the Department's work. In particular, the annual General Assembly resolution on pattern of conferences, which usually contains many provisions clarifying the evolving needs and preferences of the end-users of the Department's outputs and services, was cited.

33. Some of the Department's clients, namely, four divisions of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs whose meetings/conferences were serviced in the first half of 2000, were interviewed and their views

were mixed. One division indicated that it had been frustrated by the lack of coordination between the technical and substantive services, that the substantive services had very little guidance for the conference and that there was lack of collaboration with the substantive secretariat, which resulted in conflicting announcements during the course of its meetings in June 2000. In the opinion of OIOS, there is need for both the client and DGAACS to engage in dialogue in order to arrive at a clear understanding of the catalogue of responsibilities or division of tasks between the technical and substantive services in the course of preparing for conferences or meetings. Furthermore, DGAACS should undertake a client survey immediately after such conferences to assess satisfaction with the services provided.

34. Another division suggested that the separation of technical services from the substantive services seems to have created communication and organizational problems. There were complaints that the substantive secretariat was not consulted by the technical services when scheduling the several meetings held in 1999, and there was a suggestion that these concerns were discussed at departmental senior management meetings. Tardiness in processing documents, even when such documents were submitted by the author department within the specified deadlines, was cited. Further suggestions included the enhancement of communication between DGAACS and division heads, as well as on prioritizing the preparation of reports. To expedite documents processing, the application of technological innovations was strongly recommended.

35. On the other hand, two of the divisions that were interviewed expressed full satisfaction with the quality of the technical services they had received over the years, and commended the sharing of information by DGAACS throughout the year, especially during a special session of the General Assembly held in 2000.

36. The above clients suggested that in order to address the problem of extended meetings, the Committee on Conferences might wish to consider reviewing the number of meetings that are extended beyond prescribed schedules, given the potential negative impact of extended meetings on the quality and efficiency of the services provided to intergovernmental bodies. A review of the number of meetings, extended beyond the scheduled time of adjournment during January-June 2000, showed that of a total of 1,998 meetings, 561 were extended up to 30 minutes, 76 up to one hour and 150 up to 2 hours or more beyond their scheduled time. OIOS also requested the management of DGAACS to raise with the Committee on Conferences the possibility of suggesting the biennialization of agenda items as a means of reducing documentation.

37. Interviews were also held with the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Both confirmed that DGAACS had provided excellent and prompt technical support. Organizational meetings were constructive, and the secretariats took initiatives in foreseeing problems. The General Assembly President stated that the Executive Office of DGAACS has also been very helpful in explaining the United Nations rules and regulations. He voiced frustration with the general bureaucracy of the Organization, which often overlooks practical, simple solutions and thus delays response to the needs of his office, e.g., servicing of technical equipment. He felt that improvements in servicing the General Assembly President's office could be effected. For example, he urged that DGAACS provide the President's office with some core Professional staff who would provide continuity in the proper substantive and technical servicing of the Office.

38. The President of the Economic and Social Council also had praise for the Council Servicing Branch for its timely and constructive response to the needs of his office, especially in the area of providing facilities for meetings and conferences. He was particularly appreciative of the efforts of the Branch in ensuring close relations with non-governmental organizations during his term in office. The President of the Council expressed satisfaction with the quality of translation and interpretation provided by DGAACS. However, he regretted that some of the Council's substantive issues did not receive full consideration because of the late submission of documents. In order to enable delegates to fully understand the issues being discussed, the President of the Council urged that serious consideration be given by the Council secretariat to the timely preparation of documents and to prioritizing documents submitted for processing.

Member States

39. OIOS followed up on the above interviews in a group discussion with the Bureau members of the five-year review process of the Fourth World Conference on Women, who indicated that some of the delegates were

visibly irritated by the technical servicing difficulties experienced during the special session, especially with regard to the uncertainty of the availability of interpretation services. They maintained that there was a lack of systems back-up to minimize eventualities or drawbacks during the special session, especially the availability of senior management to make on-the-spot decisions. They also cited the inadequacy of planning, which resulted in a clash over conference facilities. However, some members of the Bureau expressed satisfaction with the services provided. OIOS wishes to point out that two of the observations deserve the particular attention of DGAACS: (a) the lack of sensitivity and awareness on the part of the technical secretariat concerning the nature and substance of the discussions; and (b) that special sessions should not be conducted in a "business as usual" manner. Management responded that "*DGAACS very definitely does not conduct special sessions as 'business as usual'. The convening of interdepartmental tasks forces under the Department's leadership to coordinate the preparations for these events, the planned provision of meeting and documentation services around the clock, the constant consultation with preparatory committees and working groups all contradict any such assumption. Notwithstanding the planning and preparatory work, however, some resources are finite in nature — conference rooms and interpretation capacity, for example — and uncertainty will always arise when their limits are exceeded*".

40. As noted above, a user survey in the form of a questionnaire was distributed to 188 Member States in late August 2000 (see annex I). A brief analysis of the responses to questions is provided below.

Impact of consolidation on DGAACS services

41. Clear majorities of respondents in the survey of Member States found that services provided by DGAACS have improved or somewhat improved compared to the situation prevailing before the Department was established: 81 per cent of correspondents considered servicing of meetings and editing of parliamentary documentation to be improved, followed by pre-session technical support services (76 per cent) and technical support services provided during meetings (72 per cent). One third of the respondents considered that translation and interpretation services have remained the same.

Services to intergovernmental bodies

42. Between 98 per cent (plenary of the General Assembly) and 87 per cent (Fourth Committee) of respondents were fully satisfied or satisfied with the technical support services of intergovernmental bodies that they attend.

43. Pre-session technical support services were rated fully or generally adequate by 87 per cent of respondents and in-session services by 82 per cent, while 89 per cent of respondents gave excellent or good ratings to translation services, 84 per cent for interpretation and 82 per cent for meeting services. Readability and presentation of parliamentary documentation was considered generally excellent or generally good by 89 per cent of respondents.

44. The exception to this generally positive picture is timeliness of documentation. Although 71 per cent of respondents considered that in-session documentation is always or mostly on time, only 58 per cent thought so with regard to pre-session documentation and 57 per cent with regard to post-session documentation.

Areas where DGAACS work needs improvement

45. Asked which specific areas of DGAACS work they thought needed improvement, more than two thirds of those who answered the question mentioned timeliness of documentation, in some cases in connection with availability of documentation in all official languages. Other areas considered needing improvement were translation and interpretation services. Specific reference was made to legal terminology in translation and technological innovations in the area of interpretation and translation. Further references were made to wider use of technology in the servicing of meetings; the establishment and distribution of lists of speakers; flexibility in adapting to delegations needs; using rules creatively to solve problems; assistance in documenting/quantifying/evaluating the consequences of the excessive amount of meetings; and starting meetings on time.

46. Most respondents commented that they were generally satisfied with the services provided by DGAACS; three mentioned an improvement since the establishment of the Department, achieved despite severe budget constraints as one pointed out. Several respondents commented that services are adequate, with room for improvement. One observation noted "a

general failure to be innovative and use new technology to improve meetings". Another observation referred to an apparent "rather old-fashioned spirit prevalent among staff". While constraints posed by infrastructure and budget were acknowledged, it was stated that Member States expected leadership by the Secretariat in administrative matters. Other comments included reference to difficulties reaching people on the telephone during peak periods; that some members of the Staff could be more cordial and helpful to delegates; and that all Member States should be treated equally.

General comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the servicing of intergovernmental bodies

47. Two respondents referred to the need for more effective and efficient or innovative interaction between delegations and the servicing staff. It was acknowledged that both sides should make an effort, but it was felt that it should be up to the Secretariat to take the lead. More and better meeting rooms and photocopiers would be useful. Other points referred to were better coordination of conference services; the timely establishment of the work programmes of the main committees and their translation into the six official languages; the full implementation of the recommendations regarding multilingualism; the equal treatment of all Member States; assistance to Member States in rationalizing meeting time; consultation in the translation of final documents with interpreters who were involved during meetings since they might grasp "subtle" differences that might mean a lot in final texts.

Management of meeting space

48. Respondents have considered the management of meeting space mostly good or satisfactory. Several noted the constraints under which the system is operating. One referred to the allocation of large areas for small gatherings; another stated a lack of space for informal consultations.

Equipment

49. The comments expressed on the equipment made available by the Secretariat through the Office of Central Support Services (OCSS), such as computers half felt that it could be improved as far as having more modern ones available. Several references were made to the benefits of a computer and projector for drafting resolutions and during informal consultations. DGAACS should examine, in consultation with OCSS, the feasibility of providing such equipment.

Professional attitude of DGAACS staff

50. While the large majority of respondents was satisfied with the professional attitude of DGAACS staff, as indicated by such descriptions as "consistently professional and helpful" or "generally friendly and helpful", some respondents mentioned that some staff could be very unhelpful. Another point made was that staff were usually very professional, cordial and helpful, though sometimes bureaucratically rigid. DGAACS should discuss these observations at staff meetings.

6. Assessment of individual performance

51. At the level of assessing individual performance, DGAACS responded that this is being done in accordance with the established norms applicable throughout the Secretariat. On the contrary however, the team noted that the Secretariat-wide performance appraisal system (PAS) is not being implemented throughout the Department. OIOS was informed that, following a management retreat in early 1999, a working group was established to address the concerns expressed by managers on the applicability of the PAS in DGAACS. After concluding its review in May 1999, the working group, inter alia, (a) recognized the importance of the core concepts of the PAS, namely, work planning (where possible), articulation of expectations at the beginning of the performance period and ongoing systematic dialogue between supervisors and staff, but felt that the PAS had neither advanced these objectives nor had it been useful in the planning of the Department's multifaceted work programme, as well as in motivating staff and assessing their performance to fill vacancies in the Department; and (b) recognized the efforts and investments involved in the PAS and suggested that ways be sought to make the PAS more relevant to the real needs of DGAACS in particular and the Secretariat as a whole. At the time of finalizing the present report, the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) had not yet

52. The inspection team was informed that as a result of the above and in the absence of penalties/sanctions against managers or staff who do not comply, the implementation of the PAS has not been fully institutionalized in the Department. As of November 2000, a large number of sections have completed less than 50 per cent of the PAS requirements covering the 1999 reporting period. OIOS views this as a serious lack of accountability on the part of programme managers, and urges that steps be taken to implement the PAS in its current form, as mandated by the Secretary-General, while other steps are being pursued to improve the system. The DGAACS working group should review its findings and formulate suggestions to overcome the resistance of certain supervisors. For example, the first reporting responsibility in the larger language services could be divided among the P-5 level staff. DGAACS management needs to include implementation of the PAS in each organizational unit as a responsibility in the individual PAS of each programme manager, for which he/she will be held accountable at the end of a reporting period.

E. Increased flexibility in deploying resources to respond quickly to the needs of intergovernmental bodies and client departments

53. OIOS reviewed the Department's efforts to deploy its limited resources, wherever possible, to meet the high demand for technical services. As a result of the enhanced coordination made possible by the new structure, servicing resources are being allocated in a way that meets those demands more efficiently. The Department cited, as proof, its increasing ability to provide services to informal groupings of Member States despite heavy demands from established bodies, even though no resources are budgeted for this purpose. Furthermore, as part of its efforts to ensure flexibility in utilizing its language staff, in 2000 DGAACS organized for the first time a common competitive examination for Spanish, English and French editors, translators and verbatim reporters.

54. The general perception of staff in the Department is that although it may be functioning effectively the Department's capacity to carry out its workload is documents in time but that the high level of quality cannot be assured.

55. OIOS is of the view that DGAACS has to examine the extent to which the practice of stretching resources to the limit, particularly human resources, may be contributing to frustration on the part of staff. OIOS observes that the staff is currently fatigued as a result of working long hours and that this may impact negatively on the quality and timeliness of the services that the Department provides to intergovernmental bodies and other client departments.

56. According to the Department's projections, 118 staff retirements will occur between 2000 and 2005, including 102 at the P-5 level, 13 at the D-1 level and three at the D-2 level. These projections do not take into account the unexpected departure of staff at other levels for other reasons, such as transfer to other departments, mission assignments and resignations. Immediate measures need to be taken to ensure that the Department's institutional memory is not depleted as a result of these departures, which could hamper efficient delivery of services to Member States.

57. The Department indicated that the authority delegated to it by OHRM to recruit new staff is limited in terms of the category of staff. DGAACS should engage OHRM in a succession-planning exercise in order to ensure the recruitment of the best-qualified conference-servicing staff. DGAACS management has confirmed its concern about these issues and advised that language examinations are being convened to address recruitment needs.

58. In the area of programme monitoring, DGAACS has indicated its willingness to adopt the integrated monitoring and documentation information system (IMDIS) for monitoring the implementation of outputs scheduled in the 2000-2001 programme budget. However, to date the required action has not yet been undertaken by DGAACS. OIOS is following up further on the matter.

V. Conclusions

59. DGAACS has registered visible improvements in strengthening the coherence, quality and efficiency of the technical support services provided to

enabled regular contact among the different components of the department, thus strengthening horizontal communication. OIOS discerns that a definite gain from the consolidation is the streamlining and improved coherence within the Department, which has contributed to overall efficiency.

60. In the survey to Member States, a majority of respondents found that services provided by DGAACS have improved compared to the situation prevailing before DGAACS was established. Comments on the timeliness of documentation were not as positive. However, responsibility for timely submission of reports rests with author departments. A Secretariat-wide initiative to be led by DGAACS needs to be undertaken at the highest level to address this perennial problem and thus reduce the incremental costs to the Organization.

61. Although the consolidation has indeed improved the delivery of technical services in some areas, some persisting constraints have hampered proper coordination between technical and substantive services, and high-level cooperation between the departments involved in the consolidation exercise is needed. The rotation of committee secretaries may also help to address some of the problems relating to technical and substantive services discussed in the present report.

62. The application of technology by DGAACS to several of its processes, e.g., computer-assisted translation, the electronic documents registration and information tracking system (eDrits), an assignment programme to facilitate interpreter assignments and the digital recording system for off-site verbatim reporting, have modernized DGAACS working methods and made them more cost-effective. More investments of both time and resources should be made in information technologies, as well as for the requisite staff training, in particular in those areas where such technologies would maximize DGAACS flexibility to respond to demand fluctuations and rapid deployment of capacity among duty stations.

63. Given that the provision of high-quality services is a major objective of the Department, it needs to have in place mechanisms that would enable it to measure the quality of its services, and systematically appraise customer satisfaction with services provided. Measures to appropriately assess individual staff performance system have to be implemented fully and consistently throughout the Department.

VI. Recommendations

64. The Under-Secretaries-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services and for Disarmament Affairs should take immediate steps to ensure that decisions taken by them to enhance the provision of technical and substantive services to the General Assembly and its subsidiary committees are fully complied with by the staff of their respective Departments. Furthermore, management should monitor such compliance and take the necessary corrective action in the event of non-compliance (SP-00-001-01) (see paras. 9 and 10 above).

65. The Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services should initiate a discussion in the senior management group on the need for Department heads to enforce compliance with document submission requirements, underscoring the cost to the Secretariat and Member States of delayed documentation (SP-00-001-02) (see para. 17 above).

66. The Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services should issue a directive on electronic submission standards and inform author departments that DGAACS will no longer accept submission of documents in hard-copy form only (SP-00-001-03) (see para. 17 above).

67. In view of the overall responsibility of the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services for conference services in New York, Geneva and Vienna, he should engage the collaboration of Geneva and Vienna, as well as the Department of Management, in the budget preparation process to ensure that conference resources are optimally utilized. Furthermore, to enhance transparency and accountability, DGAACS should request the Under-Secretary-General for Management to issue directives that would ensure that all financial reports from Geneva and Vienna to Headquarters in New York are channelled through the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services (SP-00-001-04) (see para. 21 above).

68. The current Advisory Panel on Information

and coordinated departmental IT strategy to the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services within the first six months of 2001. In the light of such a strategy, the Advisory Panel should consider whether any adjustments need to be made to the current distribution of IT staff among organizational units, which was decided at the time the Information Management and Technology Unit was established. Management should consider budgetary resource redeployment within its authority, to increase investments in IT and for staff training; senior programme managers should ensure the implementation of training plans and the reporting thereof to the Under-Secretary-General (SP-00-001-05) (see paras. 26-29 above).

69. With immediate effect, the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services should request all section/unit chiefs to establish written criteria to measure the quality of their unit's performance (SP-00-001-06) (see para. 30 above).

70. With immediate effect, the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services should issue directives to all section/unit chiefs to prepare operational guidelines for their respective areas of work to safeguard institutional memory and for the sake of efficient management. These operational guidelines should detail internal work processes as well as the external factors that would enhance the efficient delivery of work programmes, and should have built-in conditions for periodic review and updating (SP-00-001-07) (see para. 30 above).

71. As a service provider, DGAACS should continually work towards ensuring client satisfaction. Customer surveys should be issued to the intergovernmental bodies and client departments to which technical services are provided. Furthermore, lessons learned need to be reviewed after each major conference, and best practices exchanged among the technical secretariats on a regular basis, e.g., at a senior management meeting (SP-00-001-08) (see paras. 31-33 above).

72. The Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services should initiate discussions with the Committee on Conferences to identify meeting demands in order to adjust Mechanisms or guidelines for meetings or conferences should be established, in consultation with the Committee on Conferences, to ensure that extended meetings are an exception and not the rule. Such guidelines should bear in mind the budgetary implications of extended meetings, as well as the toll that extended meetings take on the well-being of staff (SP-00-001-09) (see para. 36 above).

73. DGAACS needs to institutionalize the PAS system and hold programme managers accountable for non-compliance. Directives to this effect should be issued immediately by the Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services to all section heads, and an advisory committee should be established to monitor and report on implementation to the Under-Secretary-General (SP-00-001-10) (see paras. 51 and 52 above).

(*Signed*) Dileep **Nair**
Under-Secretary-General for
Internal Oversight Services

Annex I

Survey of Member States (2000)

Totals:

No. of Questionnaires:	**188**
No. of Responses:	**45**
Response Rate:	**24%**

Question 2

In general, how would you rate the adequacy of pre-session technical support services provided by DGAACS, such as the preparation of agendas and programmes of work?

Fully Adequate	11%
Generally Adequate	76%
Somewhat Deficient	13%
Inadequate	0%

Question 3

In general, how would you rate the adequacy of the technical support services provided by DGAACS during meetings, such as coordination of list of speakers, assistance to chairpersons?

Very Adequate	34%
Adequate	48%
Somewhat Adequate	16%
Not Adequate	2%

Question 5a

How would you rate the quality of translation services provided by DGAACS?

Excellent	23%
Good	66%
Fair	9%
Poor	2%

Question 5b

How would you rate the quality of interpretation services provided by DGAACS?

Excellent	16%
Good	68%
Fair	11%
Poor	5%

Question 5c

How would you rate the quality of servicing of meetings provided by DGAACS?

Excellent	22%
Good	60%
Fair	18%
Poor	0%

Question 6

Please rate the readability and presentation of parliamentary documentation.

Generally Excellent	16%
Generally Good	73%
Generally Fair	11%
Generally Poor	0%

Question 7a

How would you rate the timeliness of pre-session parliamentary documentation?

Always on Time	5%
Mostly on Time	53%
Sometimes on Time	33%
Never on Time	9%

Question 7b

How would you rate the timeliness of in-session parliamentary documentation?

Always on Time	9%
Mostly on Time	62%
Sometimes on Time	24%
Never on Time	5%

Question 7c

How would you rate the timeliness of post-session parliamentary documentation?

Always on Time	7%
Mostly on Time	50%
Sometimes on Time	41%
Never on Time	2%

Question 8a

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
General Assembly Plenary

Fully Satisfied	30%
Satisfied	68%
Fairly Satisfied	2%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 8b

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
First Committee

Fully Satisfied	30%
Satisfied	58%
Fairly Satisfied	12%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 8d

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
Second Committee

Fully Satisfied	27%
Satisfied	64%
Fairly Satisfied	9%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 8e

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
Third Committee

Fully Satisfied	29%
Satisfied	68%
Fairly Satisfied	3%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 8f

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
Fourth Committee

Fully Satisfied	25%
Satisfied	61%
Fairly Satisfied	14%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 8g

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
Fifth Committee

Fully Satisfied	29%
Satisfied	58%
Somewhat Satisfied	10%
Not Satisfied	3%

Question 8h

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
Sixth Committee

Fully Satisfied	24%
Satisfied	73%
Somewhat Satisfied	3%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 8i

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
Security Council

Fully Satisfied	25%
Satisfied	68%
Somewhat Satisfied	4%
Not Satisfied	4%

Question 8j

Please rate technical support services of intergovernmental bodies you attend.
ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies

Fully Satisfied	25%
Satisfied	72%
Somewhat Satisfied	3%
Not Satisfied	0%

Question 10a

In your opinion how do the pre-session tech. support services provided by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	25%
Somewhat Improved	61%
Remained the Same	14%
Worse	0%

Question 10b

In your opinion how do the tech. sup. services during meetings provided by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	28%
Somewhat Improved	45%
Remained the Same	28%
Worse	0%

Question 10c

In your opinion how do the translation services provided by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	23%
Somewhat Improved	44%
Remained the Same	33%
Worse	0%

Question 10d

In your opinion how do the interpretation services provided by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	26%
Somewhat Improved	42%
Remained the Same	32%
Worse	0%

Question 10e

In your opinion how does servicing of meetings by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	34%
Somewhat Improved	47%
Remained the Same	19%
Worse	0%

Question 10f

In your opinion how does the editing of parliamentary documentation provided by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	22%
Somewhat Improved	59%
Remained the Same	19%
Worse	0%

Question 10g

In your opinion how does the provision of meeting records provided by DGAACS compare to the pre-establishment of the Department?

Improved	24%
Somewhat Improved	48%
Remained the Same	24%
Worse	4%

Annex II

Submission of pre-session documents for the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly

Author department office	*Number of pre-session documents due for GA-55*	*Number of documents submitted by 30 June deadline*	*Number of documents submitted (2 weeks beyond deadline)*
CCD	1	0	0
DDA	31	2	8
DESA	43	7	9
DGAACS	31	5	9
DM	139	36	52
DPA	31	4	4
DPI	2	1	1
DPKO	2	0	0
EOSG	2	0	0
ESCWA	1	1	1
FAO	1	0	0
GEF	1	1	1
HR	47	1	1
IAEA	1	0	0
ICJ	1	0	0
INSTRAW	1	0	0
JIU	3	2	2
OCHA	8	1	2
ODCCP	4	0	2
OIOS	12	3	3
OLA	21	3	4
OSRSG-CAC	1	0	0
REG COMM	1	0	1
UNCHS	3	1	2
UNCTAD	12	1	1
UNDP	8	2	5
UNEP	4	0	1
UNESCO	1	0	1
UNFPA	1	0	0
UNHCR	4	0	0
UNICEF	4	2	2
UNIFEM	1	0	0
UNJSPF	3	0	0
UNOV	3	0	1
UNRWA	4	0	0
UNSCO	1	0	0
UNU	2	1	1

III

Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services: organization chart

(As of 12 December 2000)